Dangerousness and Expertise Redux by Slobogin, Christopher
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2006
Dangerousness and Expertise Redux
Christopher Slobogin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 Emory Law Journal. 275 (2006)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/243
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Volume 56 2006 Number 2
ARTICLES
DANGEROUSNESS AND EXPERTISE REDUX
Christopher Slobogin*
ABSTRACT
Civil commitment, confinement under sexual predator laws, and
many capital and noncapital sentences depend upon proof of a
propensity toward violence. This Article discusses the current state
of prediction science, in particular the advantages and disadvantages
of clinical and actuarial prediction, and then analyzes how the rules
of evidence should be interpreted in deciding whether opinions about
propensity should be admissible. It concludes that dangerousness
predictions that are not based on empirically derived probability
estimates should be excluded from the courtroom unless the defense
decides otherwise. This conclusion is not bottomed on the usual
concern courts and commentators raise about expert prediction
testimony-that the associated false-positive rates are too high. In
fact, because they produce better-than-chance results, both clinical
and actuarial risk assessments are, with certain caveats, sufficiently
probative to meet the expertise threshold, whether that threshold is
defined by Frye or Daubert. Rather, the rationale for the conclusion
reached in this Article is that prediction testimony should only be
inadmissible when its prejudicial impact outweighs its (admittedly
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. The
author would like to thank John Monahan, Randy Otto, Norman Poythress, and workshop participants at
Hastings and Florida law schools for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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weak) probative value. Clinical prediction testimony should be
excluded from the government's case-in-chief under this formula,
because of its relative invulnerability to adversarial testing. But the
government should be able to use actuarial prediction testimony, as
empirical evidence suggests that this type of testimony is likely to be
taken for what it is worth. Finally, because of judges and juries'
demonstrably strong predilection toward findings of dangerousness in
commitment and sentencing proceedings, the defense should always
be able to use both clinical and actuarial testimony to rebut the state's
case.
INTRODUCTION
Over two decades ago, I wrote an article entitled Dangerousness and
Expertise that made a number of suggestions about how the rules of evidence
should apply to expert testimony aimed at predicting future antisocial
behavior.1 This Article addresses the same issue and reaches the same basic
conclusion: Expert prediction testimony based on empirically derived
probability assessments usually should be admissible, whether proffered by the
government or the defense, but clinical prediction testimony, which is still the
predominant method of proving dangerousness, should be excluded unless the
defense uses it in its case-in-chief. Despite the similarity in end result between
the two articles, a number of intervening developments require a new analysis
of the way courts make determinations about future violence.
First, as society grows increasingly frustrated with the traditional
punishment system's failure to protect its citizens, dangerousness has become
increasingly popular as a criterion for depriving people of liberty. The most
obvious example of this phenomenon is the "sex predator law" movement.
Since 1990, about one third of the states have enacted laws that permit
indeterminate post-sentence commitment of sex offenders considered to be
"predisposed" to violent behavior.2 On authority of these statutes, well over
2,500 people have been committed as sexual predators and thousands of others
1 Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984).
2 See W. Lawrence Fitch & Debra A. Hammen, The New Generation of Sex Offender Commitment
Laws: Which States Have Them and How Do They Work?, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 27, 33 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds.,
2003).
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have been subjected to sexual predator hearings. 3  Even more expansive
"dangerous offender" laws, which permit post-sentence confinement of any
offender perceived to have violent tendencies, have also been enacted.4
Meanwhile, dangerousness determinations remain important in many other
areas of the law. While criminal sentencing since 1970 has generally moved
toward fixed terms based on backward-looking culpability assessments, 5 recent
Supreme Court decisions could push the states back toward indeterminate
6dispositions grounded on risk assessments, and several states continue to
make the risk of future violent crime an aggravating circumstance in death
penalty cases. 7  Finally, the civil commitment laws of virtually every state
permit involuntary hospitalization based on the likelihood of imminent harm to
others,8 and similar provisions authorize commitment of those found not guiltyby reason of insanity. 9
A second reason why a fresh look at methods of proving dangerousness is
needed is that prediction methodology has significantly improved. Two
decades ago, actuarial models for predicting violent behavior were in their
infancy and the dominant method of evaluating dangerousness was essentially
seat-of-the-pants, "clinical" speculation. Today the development of several
sophisticated, empirically validated risk assessment instruments has made
prediction much more of a science.
I0
A third reason why the topic addressed in this Article is worth revisiting is
that the law of evidence has changed significantly. Until 1993, most courts
3 W. Lawrence Fitch, Sexual Offender Commitment in the United States: Legislative and Policy
Concerns, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sc!. 489, 492 (2003) (reporting that, as of the summer of 2002, 2,478
individuals had been committed or were being held as sexually violent predators in the United States).
4 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962 (West 2006).
' 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (2000) (stating that sentences should be based only on offense characteristics and
deterrence); § 994(k) (rejecting rehabilitation as a goal of sentencing); 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a)-(b) (2000)
(abolishing parole).
6 Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV.
693, 726-27, 731-33 (2005) (describing the impact of the Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker cases-U.S.
Supreme Court cases restructuring sentencing that were all decided since 2000-and predicting much more
variation in sentencing based in part on predictive criteria).
7 At least six states have such provisions. Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of
Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision
Making, 29 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 64 n.5 (2005).
8 RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 670
(4th ed. 2004).
9 Id. at 830.
'o See infra Part 11.
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evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony using one of two tests: The
"balancing test" (derived from the balancing required by Federal Rules of
Evidence 401, 402 and 403)," I which weighs the probative value of the
evidence against the likelihood it will mislead or confuse the fact finder or
unfairly prejudice one of the parties, and the Frye test, derived from Frye v.
United States,12 which looks at whether the basis of the testimony is "generally
accepted" among professionals in the relevant field. 13 Today, however, the
federal courts and more than half the states follow the test announced in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,14 which, at least on its face, is much
tougher to meet. Daubert requires that expert testimony be validated or
verified, preferably using scientific methodology that produces error rates
rather than simply through assessment of whether the basis of the testimony is
relevant or generally accepted. 15
The reason Daubert, Frye, and other tests of expert admissibility are
important in this context is that dangerousness assessments are often bottomed,
if not wholly dependent, on the opinions of psychiatrists and psychologists. In
some settings, particularly in connection with noncapital sentencing
proceedings, dangerousness determinations may be based entirely on lay
judgments, usually made by probation officers and judges. But in numerous
other settings-in particular, capital sentencing, police power civil
commitment proceedings, and sexual predator hearings-mental health
professionals and other "experts" on dangerousness are almost always involved
in assisting the decision makers who predict antisocial conduct.
16
A number of commentators, writing both before and after Daubert raised
the admissibility threshold, have asserted that this practice of relying on mental
I FED. R. EvID. 401-03 (Rule 401 defines relevance, Rule 402 states that "[alll relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided," and Rule 403 states that "relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed" by the types of factors mentioned in the text.).
12 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
13 See Paul Giannelli, Daubert in the States, 34 CRIM. L. BULL. 154, 155-56 (1998), for a description of
these tests and their history.
14 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States,
44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 356-61 (2004), for a discussion of the number of states that have adopted Daubert.
15 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94. In 1999, the Court made clear that this test governed the admissibility of
"technical" and "specialized" knowledge, as well as "scientific" knowledge, preventing courts from avoiding
Daubert's dictates by classifying testimony as "non-scientific." Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137 (1999).
16 See GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 258-67, 323 (2d ed. 1997), for a discussion of the role of
mental health professionals in commitment and sentencing proceedings.
[Vol. 56
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health professionals to assist in making legally relevant predictions should stop
or be severely circumscribed.' 7  The official organs of the mental health
professions have long voiced similar views. Back in 1974, the American
Psychiatric Association stated that "[p]sychiatric expertise in the prediction of
'dangerousness' is not established."' 18  Four years later, the American
Psychological Association came to much the same conclusion, asserting that
"the validity of psychological predictions of violent behavior, at least in...
sentencing and release situations .... is extremely poor, so poor that one could
oppose their use on the strictly empirical grounds that psychologists are not
professionally competent to make such judgments."' 9  Today, despite
improvements in prediction science, forensic professionals are still cautious
about endorsing opinion testimony concerning violent propensities.
20
The courts, however, have paid no attention to such assertions. In 1983,
despite amicus briefs incorporating statements like those quoted above, as well
as John Monahan's 1981 conclusion, based on a meta-review of the studies,
that two out of three long-term predictions of violence are wrong, the Supreme
Court upheld the admissibility of prediction testimony from mental health
professionals in death penalty proceedings. 2 1  That holding, in Barefoot v.
Estelle,22 still stands. If executions may be predicated on prediction testimony,
presumably sex offenders and mentally ill people subject to commitment may
be confined based on such opinion evidence as well.
17 Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 701-08 (1974) (arguing that expert prediction testimony should be
banned); Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S.
CAL. L. REV. 527, 621-22 (1978) (stating that only "hard" actuarial prediction should be permitted); David
Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 SCI. 31, 33-35 (1988) (only
actuarial data should be admissible); Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Admissibility of Expert
Testimony Based upon Clinical Judgment and Scientific Research, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1226, 1250
(1998) (same); Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent
Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1848 (2003) (same, but advocating that
actuarial devices be "used with caution").
18 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N TASK FORCE, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 33 (1974).
19 Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, 33 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978).
20 RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC PRACTICE: MENTAL HEALTH
AND CRIMINAL LAW 298, 306 (2005) (noting "the marked limitations of risk assessment in predicting
recidivism for sex offenders" and the "significant errors" produced by modem risk assessment measures).
21 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 n.7 (1983) (describing APA amicus brief and Monahan's
conclusion).
22 Id. at 880.
2006]
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Barefoot, however, only announced the constitutional minimum;
evidentiary rules can demand more of experts, as Frye and Daubert do. Using
a four-part analytical framework derived from traditional evidence law,23 I take
an intermediate position, as I did in my first article on the subject, between
complete exclusion and unquestioned acceptance of expert testimony on
dangerousness. Traditional clinical testimony regarding a person's future
behavior, while material, probative, and, on its face, helpful, is so prejudicial
(and thus ultimately unhelpful) that in most settings it should be admissible
only if the person first seeks to use clinical testimony to show that he or she is
not dangerous. If the individual eschews such testimony, then the state should
be limited to proving dangerousness using appropriately normed actuarial
instruments or structured interview instruments that are tied to explicit
probability estimates.
This Article develops this argument in eight parts. Part I describes the
current state of prediction science. It explains the difference between the three
primary prediction methodologies-clinical, actuarial, and structured
professional judgment-and then evaluates their relative reliability. Part II
examines the relevant evidentiary case law, which for the most part has not
differentiated between prediction methodologies, and in any event has usually
permitted any type of prediction testimony, regardless of its basis. Part III
begins my own evidentiary analysis with an assessment of the materiality of
prediction testimony, in particular the extent to which materiality is
undermined by nomothetic (group-based) prediction or prediction based on
characteristics over which the person has little or no control. Parts IV and V of
the Article argue that prediction testimony is also usually probative and
helpful, despite its relatively low accuracy rate. It is probative whenever it is
derived from a methodology that produces predictions that are better than
chance, and it is helpful whenever it is based on the literature about violence
risk and avoids ultimate issue language.
Those conclusions establish a presumption in favor of admitting prediction
testimony. However, the fourth component of traditional evidentiary
analysis-which looks at potential prejudicial impact-requires significant
limitations on clinical, as opposed to actuarial, testimony, at least outside the
civil commitment context. Part VI asserts that when offered by the
government in its case-in-chief, testimony that is not linked to specific risk
23 For a fuller description of this framework, see Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal
Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1998).
[Vol. 56
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probabilities is too prone to misinterpretation and misuse, and thus whatever
probative value it has is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. In
contrast, when proffered by the subject of the prediction (the criminal offender
or the respondent in a commitment proceeding), the prejudicial impact of
probative prediction testimony is likely to be slight, given the natural
inclination of fact finders to assume those subject to sentencing and
commitment are dangerous. Thus, the subject should be permitted to introduce
clinical prediction testimony whenever he or she sees fit. Only if the subject
decides to do so should the government be able to use softer prediction
testimony as a method of responding to the subject's claims.
Part VII of the Article spells out how this "subject-first" regime would
work in practice. Where material, empirically derived probability estimates do
not exist, the government would have to rely on lay testimony (presumably
regarding past conduct), unless the subject of the prediction opens the door to
use of clinical prediction testimony. That door would be opened when the
offender-respondent uses clinical testimony to contradict claims that he or she
is dangerous, volitionally impaired, or untreatable, but not when the defense
expert focuses solely on culpability issues in a sentencing proceeding. This
regime allows the government to prove dangerousness in the most accurate,
least confounding manner, while permitting the offender-respondent to attack
the state's attempt at preventive detention on the ground that the "numbers" do
not accurately reflect his or her violence potential.
Part VIII of the Article briefly describes why the foregoing analysis may
not be applicable to emergency civil commitment. Simply put, short-term
clinical dangerousness predictions of the type at issue in civil commitment
hearings are probably more accurate than the long-term predictions required in
other settings. Even if they are not, practical reasons might dictate continued
reliance on clinical prediction in this one setting.
As this summary indicates, this Article will focus, as my previous article
did, on four types of proceedings: civil commitment, "criminal" commitment
(commitment and release hearings of sexual predators and people acquitted by
reason of insanity), noncapital sentencing hearings, and capital sentencing
proceedings. Although much of what is said here could apply to other
24proceedings, these four are most likely to involve expert assessments of
dangerousness to others.
24 "Shah has identified II other stages of the legal process at which dangerousness assessments are made,
including pretrial release hearings, juvenile transfer decisions, and transfer of prisoners to special prisons for
2006]
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Even limited to its use in these settings, "dangerousness" can take on a
number of different meanings. For example, in capital sentencing, "the term
usually refers solely to one's propensity to cause serious bodily injury to
another. ''25 In the civil or criminal commitment contexts, in contrast, it might
also refer to the likelihood that a person will cause damage to property,26 and
can even encompass emotional harm. 27  Civil commitment focuses on
imminent danger, while the other three contexts are more concerned with long-
term dangerousness. Finally, the degree of risk that justifies intervention may
well differ depending upon the type of intervention.28  For instance,
aggravators in death penalty cases usually must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, whereas civil commitment is permissible if the state meets the lesser
clear and convincing evidence standard.29
I will emphasize these distinctions where appropriate. But for the most part
I will not distinguish between them. Thus, I will usually use the term
"dangerousness" without further explanation, trusting the reader to recognize
that the term can vary in meaning depending on the context.
disruptive offenders." Id. at 101 n.15 (citing Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring
Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 224, 225 (1978)).
25 Id. at 102; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(i) (2006) (requiring "propensity to commit
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071 § 2(b)(1) (Vernon 2006) (requiring "probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4C (2004) (same).
26 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-315(a)(1) (2006) (release of insanity acquittees required if they "no
longer create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of
another"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001(6) (2003) (permitting civil commitment if individual poses a threat
of substantial damage to property); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-1 (2005) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
2946(3)(a) (Supp. 2002) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02(12)(b) (1987) (same). In Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983), the Supreme Court stated, in the context of criminal commitment
proceedings, "We do not agree with petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness is not established
by proof that a person committed a non-violent crime against property." Id. at 364-65.
27 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-1 (2005) (dangerousness to others defined as "likely to do
substantial physical or emotional injury on another"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(16)(b) (2006) (dangerousness
to others defined as "serious emotional injury on members of the person's family or others who lack
reasonable opportunity to avoid contact with the person").
28 Jay Katz & Alan Goldstein, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, 131 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES
404,410-11 (1960).
29 Compare IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9) (2006) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all
aggravating factors in capital cases), with Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (permitting civil
commitment by clear and convincing evidence).
[Vol. 56
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I. THE SCIENCE OF PREDICTION
Mental health professionals use a number of different prediction
techniques. Research evaluating the accuracy of these techniques suggests that
clinicians are not as poor at prognostication as the critics suggest, although it
also leaves no doubt that expert prediction is far from perfect. The discussion
below describes the various prediction methodologies and their strengths and
flaws, including their relative accuracy.
A. Prediction Methodologies
Until the late 1980s, almost all expert testimony regarding dangerousness
was clinical in nature. That is, it relied on whatever information the individual
clinician deemed pertinent. In the past twenty years, more structured
approaches to prediction have been developed. An actuarial approach relies,
like insurance actuaries do, on a finite number of pre-identified variables that
statistically correlate to risk and that produce a definitive probability or
probability range of risk. A third, hybrid prediction method, known as
adjusted actuarial assessment, begins with an actuarial assessment that the
professional then adjusts, based on individualized factors not considered in the
actuarial formula. A final prediction methodology-called structured
professional judgment or guided clinical assessment-also relies, like actuarial
prediction, on an evaluation of a finite number of predefined factors that have
been associated with risk, but neither the factors nor the final conclusions
about risk are mathematically obtained.3 °
An exemplary illustration of the clinical approach to prediction, back in the
days when it was king, is provided by the work of Dr. Harry Kozol and his
associates in 1972. Every prediction made by Kozol and his colleagues
required "independent examinations by at least five clinicians, a battery of
psychological tests, and 'a meticulous reconstruction of the life history [of the
subject] elicited from multiple sources."' 31 A second example of clinical
prediction-but one that sits at the other end of the spectrum-comes from the
case of Estelle v. Smith, in which James Grigson, a psychiatrist in Texas,
30 For descriptions of these techniques, see Kevin S. Douglas & Jennifer L. Skeem, Violence Risk
Assessment: Getting Specific About Being Dynamic, I I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 347, 352-53 (2005); R.
Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 50, 52-
53 (1998).
31 Harry L. Kozol et al., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 371, 383
(1972), quoted in Slobogin, supra note 1, at I11.
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purported to be able to deliver an opinion on competency to stand trial,
insanity, and dangerousness based solely on a ninety minute interview with
Smith, the defendant.
32
The types of information underlying clinical predictions vary immensely,
from examiner to examiner and case to case. Of particular importance to
Kozol and his associates were "details in the description of the [triggering
crime]." 33 In addition, they attempted to ascertain the extent to which the
individual
harbors anger, hostility, and resentment; enjoys witnessing or
inflicting suffering; lacks altruistic and compassionate concern for
others; sees himself as a victim rather than as an aggressor; resents or
rejects authority; is primarily concerned with his own satisfaction and
with the relief of his own discomfort; is intolerant of frustration or
delay of satisfaction; lacks control of his own impulses; has
immature attitudes toward social responsibility; lacks insight into his
own psychological structure; and distorts his perception of reality in
accordance with his own wishes and needs.
34
This detailed focus on themes or commonalities in the examinee's behavior in
order to identify risk or protective factors is sometimes called anamnestic
assessment. 35 Dr. Grigson again provides a contrast. In Barefoot v. Estelle,
another case in which he was the prosecution's key witness, he stated there
was a "one hundred percent and absolute" chance that Barefoot would commit
acts of criminal violence, despite never having interviewed him. 36  Rather,
Grigson's testimony rested entirely on a hypothetical question describing
Barefoot's four nonviolent offenses, his arrest on charges of statutory rape and
unlawful restraint of a child, his escape from prison after that arrest, and the
events surrounding the capital murder,37 which admittedly were horrific.
38
Actuarial prediction is much more structured than clinical prediction.
Probably the most prominent actuarial prediction device is the Violence Risk
32 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 457-60 (1981).
33 Harry Kozol, The Diagnosis of Dangerousness, in VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 3, 8 (Stefan A. Pastemack
ed., 1975).
34 Kozol et al., supra note 31, at 379.
35 MELTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 284-85.
36 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 917-19 (1983) (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
31 Id. at 917-19.
38 Barefoot shot at point-blank range a police officer who wanted to ask him questions about a fire (that
Barefoot apparently had started to divert attention from a planned robbery). Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d
875, 878-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
[Vol. 56
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Appraisal Guide (VRAG).39 The VRAG focuses on twelve empirically
derived and relatively narrow variables-no other information is considered in
making the assessment-and its goal is to produce a score that indicates a
particular probability of recidivism. 40  For example, a score of 0-6 on the
VRAG is associated with at least a 35% probability of "violent recidivism"
within seven years, while a score of 21-27 is associated with a 76% risk of
such recidivism over that period.4 1  A key variable on the VRAG is the
individual's score on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (described
in more detail below); all by itself, a rating of 35 or more on this measure
results in 12 points on the VRAG, which indicates a recidivism risk of 44%
(whereas, for example, a rating of 0-4 on the PCL-R results in -5 points on the
42VRAG, associated with a 17% risk). The eleven other variables in the
VRAG focus on past misconduct, psychiatric diagnosis, substance abuse, age
at the time of the offense, parental presence, and the gender of and harm to the
victim.43  Again, the points received on each variable are added and the
composite score is then used to ascertain a recidivism risk, based on study of
the criminal histories of others with similar scores.44
Another actuarial approach, initially known as the multiple Iterative
Classification Tree (ICT) and now called Classification of Violence Risk
(COVR), requires the examiner to analyze risk using what amounts to risk flow
charts.45 For instance, under one classification tree, the evaluator first
determines whether the person demonstrates low or high psychopathy. If
psychopathy is low, the evaluator then determines whether the individual has
been arrested only a "few" times or "many" times; if the former, the evaluator
then looks at recent violence, if the latter, the examiner ascertains whether the
39 The best description of the VRAG and pertinent research is found in VERNON L. QUINSEY, VIOLENT
OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK (2d ed. 2006). For more information, see Grant T. Harris et
al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders: The Development of a Statistical Prediction
Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 315 (1993).
40 See QUINSEY, supra note 39, at 160-63; Harris et al., supra note 39, at 378.
41 A more recent prospective study found that over a five-year period these two categories were
associated with a 42% and 71% chance of reoffending, respectively. Grant T. Harris et al., Prospective
Replication of the "Violence Risk Appraisal Guide" in Predicting Violent Recidivism Among Forensic
Patients, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 377, 385 (2002).
42 Harris et al., supra note 41, at 380.
43 id. at 378.
44 id.
45 A good description of the conceptual work for this instrument is found in JOHN MONAHAN ET AL.,
RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 133-34
(2001); see also Henry J. Steadman et al., A Classification Tree Approach to the Development of Actuarial
Violence Risk Assessment Tools, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (2000).
20061
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individual abuses drugs or alcohol. If the individual instead demonstrates
strong psychopathic tendencies, the evaluator first determines whether the
individual suffered serious abuse as a child; if so, then inquiry into substance
abuse occurs.46 At each step, a particular answer is associated with a particular
recidivism probability.
Other actuarial devices focus specifically on sex offenders. For instance,
the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool relies on sixteen variables (for
front-end commitments) or twenty-one variables (if the offender is being
considered for release).47 In addition to scoring points for convictions, arrests,
and other items similar to those on the VRAG, this instrument requires the
examiner to look at the age of the victim, the length of sexual offending
48history, and employment history. Living up to its name, the Rapid Risk
Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism (RRASOR) relies on only four
variables (prior sex offenses, age at release, victim gender, and relationship to
victim). 49 Each of these instruments also produces a score that is associated
with a particular risk of recidivism.
In an adjusted actuarial approach, the examiner would use one of these
devices as a baseline but then raise or lower the risk prediction based on other
considerations, typically those known to relate to offending. For instance, an
examiner administering the VRAG might lower the probability of recidivism if
he or she knows the offender has done well in treatment or is about to get
married. Or the risk level might be raised if the individual has made threats or
has stated that, if released, he will join a gang. 5 °
One of the best examples of the final methodology-structured
professional judgment-is the HCR-20 violence risk assessment scheme,
which consists of 20 items relating to three categories of information:
46 For a basic description, see Steadman et al., supra note 45, at 84.
47 David L. Epperson et al., Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R):
Development, Validation, and Recommended Risk Level Cut Scores, (Dec. 2003), http://www.psychology.
iastate.edu/faculty/epperson/TechUpdatePaperl2-03.pdf); see also Richard Hamill, Recidivism of Sex
Offenders: What You Need to Know, 15 CRIM. JUST. 24, 30 (2001).
48 Epperson et al., supra note 47, at 13.
49 See R. KARL HANSON, PUB. WORKS & GOV'T SERVS. CAN., THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BRIEF
ACTUARIAL SCALE FOR SEXUAL OFFENSE RECIDIVISM 13-14 (1997), http://ww2.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/
publications/corrections/199704_.e.pdf.
50 See generally Hanson, supra note 30, at 65-67 (discussing the types of factors that might adjust an
actuarial prediction).
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historical, clinical, and risk management. 5 1 The history scale contains ten
items: previous violence, age at first violent incident, relationship instability,
employment problems, substance use problems, major mental illness,
psychopathy, early maladjustment, personality disorder, and prior supervision
failure. The five items on the clinical scale are lack of insight, negative
attitudes, active symptoms of major mental illness, impulsivity, and
unresponsiveness to treatment. 53 Finally, the five risk management scale items
are infeasibility of plans, exposure to destabilizers, lack of personal support,
noncompliance with remediation attempts, and stress.54 Examiners rate each
item on a scale of 0-2, making 40 the maximum possible score. Although this
scheme resembles the actuarial devices described above, there is no algorithm
that statistically correlates a given score with a risk probability. Rather, the
examiner arrives at risk ratings of low, moderate, or high based on his or her
clinical assessment of the various items in the protocol.5 5
Of course, the scores obtained using the HCR-20 can be and have been
correlated with risk. For instance, a follow-up study of patients who were
evaluated using this instrument found that while only 11% of those who scored
in the 0-14 range committed or threatened to commit a physically violent act
during a two-year period, 35% of those who scored over 26 did so, and 75% of
those who received the highest scores did so.56 When combined with such
studies, the HCR-20 is not very different from an actuarial device. But a
distinction still exists: Whereas actuarial devices like the VRAG were
developed empirically (through studies as to which items statistically
differentiated violent and nonviolent offenders), the items on the HCR-20
came from observational and theoretical research as to the likely correlates of
risk.
The same can be said for the Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R),
which consists of twenty factors scored on a 0-2 scale, designed to identify the
51 See Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme:
Concurrent Validity in a Sample of Incarcerated Offenders, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 3, 8 (1999).
52 id.
53 Id.
54 id.
55 Id.
56 Kevin S. Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric Patients: The HCR-20
Violence Risk Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, 67 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 917, 925 (1999) (noting that only 45% of the latter group actually committed a violent act,
while 35% only threatened one).
20061
HeinOnline  -- 56 Emory L.J. 287 2006-2007
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
extent to which an individual is psychopathic. 57  As with the HCR-20, the
items on the PCL-R were developed through clinical observation rather than
mechanistically. Further, the ultimate score obtained indicates degree of
psychopathy, not risk potential. But, as noted above, additional research has
found that the instrument is also a good predictor of violence, with a score of
greater than 30 (on a 40-point scale) indicating a strong propensity for
violence.5 8
B. A Comparison of Actuarial and Clinical Prediction
Because both the validity research reported below and my proposed
approach to prediction testimony make distinctions between these various
methodologies, a closer look at them will be useful. Each methodology has
advantages and disadvantages.
One advantage of both the actuarial and structured judgment techniques is
that they combine variables more reliably (that is, in a manner that is more
easily replicated) than clinical opinions do. 59 Each of the first two approaches
transparently designates the specific factors the predictor must consider.
Compared to actuarial prediction, the structured clinical approach gives the
examiner more flexibility as to how much weight to assign to each predictor,
but it still limits the examiner to the listed predictors and requires reference to
a specified scale (e.g., 0-2). An unstructured clinical prediction, in contrast,
"must ultimately be based upon an overall subjective impression which is
based upon an understanding of the interrelatedness of many facts.' '6  Because
these subjective impressions are likely to differ across clinicians and even
across cases with respect to the same clinician, each clinical prediction is
57 Robert D. Hare, The Hare PCL-R: Some Issues Concerning Its Use and Misuse, 3 LEGAL & CRIM.
PSYCHOL. 99, 100 (1998).
58 Steven Wong, Recidivism and Criminal Career Profiles of Psychopaths: A Longitudinal Study, 24
ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL & LEGAL PSYCHOL. 147 (1995); see also Mamie E. Rice et al., An Evaluation of a
Maximum Security Therapeutic Community for Psychopaths and Other Mentally Disordered Offenders, 16 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 399, 406 (1992) (reporting that 77% of those who scored higher than 25 on the PCL-R
committed a violent offense despite treatment).
59 See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 122. "Unlike the actuarial predictor, '[a] clinical decisionmaker is not
committed in advance of decision to the factors that will be considered and the rule for combining them."' Id
at 122 n.94 (quoting Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical
Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1423 (1979)).
60 SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 314 (1967), quoted in Slobogin,
supra note 1, at 122-23.
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highly likely to be based on a "different constellation of factors," some of
61
which may be irrelevant or based on erroneous stereotypes and prejudices.
Furthermore, as indicated above, the actuarial and structured approaches
can provide more precise probability estimates than is possible through the
clinical process. Because it is not standardized, a clinical evaluation of
dangerousness cannot be reliably compared to other predictions. At best, the
evaluator can give the court information about his or her own accuracy rate
(which is rarely available) and the accuracy rate of other clinicians who make
predictions (which is not particularly helpful in assessing this evaluator's
work). As a consequence of this paucity of data, honest clinical evaluators
asked to state the violence proneness of a particular individual can at best rate
subjects as high or low risk, and in doing so they have only their experience
and clinical wisdom to back them up. In contrast, the VRAG and similar
devices definitively state the probability of reoffending within a certain time
period for people who have the subject's characteristics.
As I noted in my previous article, 62 however, an actuarial prediction does
have at least two drawbacks. First, actuarial information is not presently
available for some of the populations that are likely to be evaluated. For
instance, minimal data exist about the reoffending rates of insanity acquittees
or offenders sentenced to death. Whereas a clinical prediction does not rely on
this type of information, an actuarial prediction depends on it, as do structured
approaches to the extent their results are tied to specific recidivism
probabilities.
An even more trenchant criticism of actuarial prediction, to a lesser extent
also true of structured judgment approaches, is that it inevitably neglects
63pertinent characteristics of the individual evaluated. An actuarial prediction
may give us the most explicit information we can obtain about sex offenders
who committed their first sex offense before age twenty-six against a female
victim. But it tells us nothing about the extent to which other factors that were
not included in the instrument and not researched by its developers 64 might
61 See MELTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 278-79 (discussing judgment errors and biases that can affect
clinical prediction).
62 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 123.
63 id. at 124-25 (citing PAUL MEEHL, What Can the Clinician Do Well?, in PSYCHODIAGNOSIS:
SELECTED PAPERS 165, 169-70 (1973) (discussing factors favoring clinical prediction)); Underwood, supra
note 59, at 1427-28).
64 Note that the developers of the VRAG considered fifty variables and found that only twelve were
significantly related to violence. Grant T. Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 L. & HUM.
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increase or decrease the potential for reoffending. As I noted in my previous
article, "It is in discovering these idiosyncratic characteristics that the clinical
process provides information, however imprecise, that an actuarial prediction
cannot.' 65 Thus, leading researchers in the area have stated that "actuarial
instruments . . . are best viewed as 'tools' for clinical assessment ....
[R]eliance on clinical judgment-aided by an empirical understanding of risk
factors for violence and their interactions-reflects, and in our view should
reflect, the standard of care at this juncture in the field's development., 66
One final difference between the methodologies-but one that is not as
great as some have suggested-has to do with the types of variables consulted.
Actuarial instruments tend to be more objective than more clinical approaches,
in the sense that they rely heavily on "hard" variables that are relatively easy to
ascertain, such as prior convictions and age. But it should also be apparent
from the above descriptions that actuarial devices can incorporate more
subjective, "soft" variables as well. The VRAG's reliance on the PCL-R
illustrates this point. In addition to delving into specific types of antisocial
conduct, the latter instrument requires assessment of the individual's glibness,
grandiosity, need for stimulation, penchant for pathological lying,
manipulativeness, lack of remorse, affect, callousness, and similar variables. 6
7
Although the scoring criteria for these variables are fairly tightly defined and
can be reliably scored by trained examiners, 68 they do not eliminate thesubjectivity of the prediction process.
C. The Validity of Prediction Methodologies
Attempts to gauge the validity of a given prediction confront a number of
obstacles. Two in particular are important to note at the outset: First, those
predicted to be at high risk are generally confined, or at least treated, making
ambiguous whether subsequent failure to offend means the prediction-
presumably focused on behavior while unconfined-was inaccurate. Second,
even if release of the purportedly dangerous person occurs for some reason,
follow-up to ascertain the accuracy of a prediction can be very difficult;
BEHAV. 625, 631 tbl.l (1991). Thus, for the thirty-eight excluded variables, there is some basis for
considering them irrelevant to prediction.
65 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 125.
66 MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 134.
67 Hare, supra note 57, at 100.
68 Grant T. Harris et al., The Construct of Psychopathy, 28 CRIME & JUST. 197, 217 (2001) ("The PCL-R
has yielded high inter-rater reliability and test-retest reliability on prisoners and forensic psychiatric
patients.").
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conviction and arrest records seriously underreport crime, 69 and self-reports
about incriminating acts are obviously problematic as well. Thus, any research
evaluating predictive validity is likely to underestimate it.
Even taking these caveats into account, early research on dangerousness
predictions was not encouraging. The initial studies measured validity in terms
of false positives (the proportion predicted to be violent who were not) and
false negatives (the proportion predicted to be nonviolent who were not).
While finding relatively small false-negative rates, these studies reported false-
positive rates of anywhere from 40 to 90%, with the usual finding somewhere
in the 60 to 70% range.70  That led to Monahan's conclusion in 1981 that the
best clinical prediction methods produce erroneous predictions of
dangerousness two out of three times.
7 1
In light of more recent studies that try to correct for the methodological
difficulties mentioned above, however, the typical false-positive rate for expert
predictions should probably be revised downward to around 50%. For
instance, a study of the COVR's validity that relied on record checks and self-
reports of those who were released from the hospital showed that 49% of those
predicted to be high risk committed at least one violent act within 20 weeks of
release. 72  Other well-done studies, using both clinical and actuarial
methodologies, produce similar or even somewhat more positive results. 73 As
early as 1984, only one year after Barefoot and only three years after his one-
out-of-three statement, Monahan conceded that even clinical predictions of
violence might be correct one out of two times.
74
69 See MELTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 283 (reporting a study finding that self-reports increased base
rates from 3% to 40%).
70 See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 110-11, 117-18 (describing eight clinical prediction studies and three
actuarial prediction studies finding false-positive rates ranging from 54% to 92%).
71 JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47 (1981).
72 John Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model of Violence Risk Assessment for Persons with Mental
Disorders, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 810, 814 tbl.2 (2005).
73 For studies of clinical prediction, see L. Joy Apperson et al., Short-Term Clinical Prediction of
Assaultive Behavior: Artifacts of Research Methods, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1374 (1993) (25%); Charles W.
Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1007 (1993) (47%);
Diana S. Sepejak et al., Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness: Two- Year Follow-up of 408 Pre-Trial
Forensic Cases, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 171 (1983) (44%). For studies of actuarial prediction,
see Deidre Klassen & William A. O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of Violence in Adult Male
Mental Health Admissions, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 143 (1988) (40%), and the research reported in the following
text.
74 John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and
Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 11 (1984); see also Randy Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health
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The false-positive rate, however, is only part of the story. The accuracy of
expert predictions can be fully understood only if base rates of recidivism are
taken into account. If, for instance, the base rate for violence among the
population studied (say, serial sex offenders) is 50%, then a 50% false-positive
rate would be no better than chance selection. Those carrying out the
prediction would do just as well simply assigning, with no evaluation, every
second individual to the dangerous category. On the other hand, a false-
positive rate of 50% is quite impressive if only 1 out of 100 people in the
relevant population. commit crime during the follow-up period; under these
circumstances, a correct prediction of violence 1 out of 2 times would be 50
times more accurate than random assignment.75
In recognition of this interplay between accuracy and base rates,
researchers developed a second way of measuring predictive validity. The
"receiver operating characteristic" curve represents the true positive rate
(sensitivity) as a function of the false-positive rate (specificity).76 The "area
under the curve" (AUC) produced by this function provides a measure of
accuracy as it relates to base rates. If the AUC value is .50, the predictive
power of the methodology is no better than chance, while an AUC value of 1.0
represents perfect accuracy, and a value of 0 means complete inaccuracy. An
AUC value of .75 for a given prediction methodology indicates a 75% chance
that a recidivist will receive a higher risk rating than a nonrecidivist. 7
Douglas Mossman reanalyzed 58 early studies (from 1972 to 1991) and
found that, despite their often high false-positive rates, 47 of them
demonstrated prediction accuracy "significantly better than chance," with an
average AUC value of .67 for clinical prediction and .71 for actuarial
Professionals to "Predict Dangerousness": A Commentary on Interpretations of the "Dangerousness"
Literature, 18 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 43, 63 & n.63 (1994).
[W]hereas first generation research suggested that perhaps one out of three people predicted to
engage in some kind of violent behavior will actually go on to do so, more recent studies suggest
that one out of every two people predicted to be violent would go on to engage in some kind of
legally relevant, violent behavior.
Id. at 63.
75 I first pointed this out in 1984. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 112-14.
76 The more true positives and the fewer false positives, the more accurate the predictive method. For
general background on ROC curves in the context of predicting dangerous sexual behavior, see, e.g., R. Karl
Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk Assessments for Sex Offenders: A Comparison of Three Actuarial
Scales, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 125 (2000).
77 Kevin Douglas & John Weir, HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: Overview and Annotated
Bibliography 4 (2005), http://www.sfu.ca/psyc/faculty/hart/Guides.htm (follow "Download PDF' hyperlink).
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prediction made on a cross-validation group. 78 Representative AUC values for
modem actuarial devices are generally as good or better: .76 to .80 for the
VRAG 79 and .63 for the COVR. Studies of the HCR-20 have found AUC
values ranging from .69 to .89, depending on the population studied,8 1 and
82
research on the PCL-R has obtained a value of around .72. These findings
obviously do not indicate perfect accuracy, but they do demonstrate that
professional predictions are much better than chance selection.
A separate validity issue is whether adjusting an actuarial prediction using
additional, nonactuarialized factors improves the ultimate prediction. Some
commentators have stated that "[a]ctuarial methods are too good and clinical
judgment too poor to risk contaminating the former with the latter. ' 83 But, as
already noted, others hold an opposing view, with some, for example, pointing
to research indicating that "considering current clinical conditions (especially
regarding the presence of heightened anger or violent fantasies) can be an
important contribution to assessments of dangerousness. " 84 It seems fair to say
that this issue remains unresolved at the present time.
II. THE COURTS' NONCHALANCE TOWARD PREDICTION TESTIMONY
Until very recently, none of these nuances affected judicial analysis of
prediction testimony. As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court's
decision in Barefoot v. Estelle refused to put constitutional limitations on such
testimony, at least as long as it is presented in an adversarial proceeding.
85
Justice White's majority opinion gave two reasons for this stance. First,
Justice White characterized the suggestion that clinical prediction testimony be
prohibited in death penalty proceedings as "somewhat like asking us to
78 Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy, 62 J.
CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 783, 789 (1994). 1 focus on the medians from studies using cross-validation
samples because AUC values so derived tend to reflect more accurately the real-world validity of a device than
AUC values obtained on the sample used to derive the instrument.
79 VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 148 (1st ed.
1998); Harris et al., supra note 41, at 386.
80 Monahan et al., supra note 72, at 814.
81 Douglas & Weir, supra note 77, at 5-9.
82 M. Dolan & M. Doyle, Violence Risk Prediction: Clinical and Actuarial Measures and the Role of the
Psychopathy Checklist, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 303, 305 (2000).
83 QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 79, at 171.
84 Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL.
& L. 409, 435-36 (2001).
85 463 U.S. 880, 896-97 (1983).
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disinvent the wheel," given the multiple contexts in which dangerousness
predictions, by laypersons and experts alike, have always been permitted.
86
This unquestioning reliance on precedent-in effect saying "we will not
change because we've always done it this way"-represents legal reasoning at
its most primitive. 87 The second reason given by the Court, examined in more
detail in Part VI of this Article, provides a more substantial, if still highly
debatable, rationale: "We are unconvinced . . . that the adversary process
cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and
opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the convicted felon has
the opportunity to present his own side of the case."
88
The Court has not revisited the Barefoot issue since Daubert was decided,
so we do not know if the latter decision's emphasis on reliability, described
earlier in this Article, 89 would affect the Court's constitutional analysis. But it
is unlikely to do so. Daubert, Frye, and similar cases interpret the rules of
evidence, not the Constitution. The Court is cautious about using the
Constitution to mandate evidentiary practices that must be followed by every
jurisdiction in the country. Rather, the Court usually sets a low constitutional
floor, above which courts and legislatures are free to experiment.
90
To date, only a handful of courts and no legislatures have exercised this
freedom, even when the context is the death penalty. In the 1998 decision of
Nenno v. State, for instance, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
that any defect in clinical prediction testimony introduced in a capital
proceeding "affects the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.
91
Four years later, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found this position so
clearly supported by precedent that it was willing to characterize any objection
to such testimony as "frivolous" (a particularly strong statement given the fact
92that the testimony at issue was offered by the infamous Dr. Grigson).
Testimony based on actuarial and structured professional judgments is also
routinely admitted in death penalty cases.
93
86 Id. at 896-97.
87 See Slobogin, supra note I, at 159-60.
88 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901.
89 See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
90 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
9' 970 S.W.2d 549, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
92 Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 254 (5th Cir. 2002).
93 See, e.g., Martinez v. Dretke, 99 F. App'x 538, 542 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d
803 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that testimony in a capital case based on the PCL-R is admissible under Daubert).
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If prediction testimony is admissible to support an execution, it presumably
should be admissible in any case. A survey of the case law largely confirms
this surmise. A review of sexual predator cases conducted in 2002 found
virtually no appellate decisions upholding challenges to expert prediction
testimony, 94 and decisions since then have continued that trend.95  A 2003
survey of civil commitment cases likewise concluded that "[j]udicial opinion,
split on virtually every other form of behavioral or psychic expertise, has so far
unanimously accepted predictive expertise in civil commitments.
96
There are signs of judicial discontent, but they have been scattered and
uninfluential. In his dissent in Barefoot, Justice Blackmun argued that, given
the inaccuracy of clinical prediction testimony and its potential for
overinfluencing the jury, courts should hear only "[f]ay testimony, frankly
based on statistical factors with demonstrated correlations to violent
behavior." 97  Judge Emilio Garza, countering his colleagues on the Fifth
Circuit, made the same argument seventeen years later and bolstered it with the
assertion that, because it is so often wrong, expert prediction testimony "fails"
Daubert.98 A federal district court judge echoed the latter view in 2004, albeit
in dictum.99  And in the past decade, a smattering of state courts have
forthrightly concluded that some types of prediction testimony are
inadmissible.
0 0
94 Randy K. Otto & John Petrila, Admissibility of Testimony Based on Actuarial Scales in Sex Offender
Commitments: A Reply to Doren, 3 SEX OFFENDER L. REP. 1 (2002). Trial courts in Iowa, Arizona, Florida,
and Missouri have excluded predictive opinion, but appellate courts in the first two states overruled those
decisions, and appellate courts in the latter two states have yet to address the issue. See In re Detention of
Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) ("Our research has revealed no state appellate court
decision which has found actuarial instruments inadmissible at [sexually violent predator] proceedings."
(quoting In re Commitment of R. S., 773 A.2d 72, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001))).
95 See, e.g., In re Detention of Traynoff, 831 N.E.2d 709 (II1. App. Ct. 2005); In re Detention of Holtz,
653 N.W.2d at 619 (permitting actuarial evaluation only when used "in conjunction with a full clinical
evaluation"); Commonwealth v. Bradway, 816 N.E.2d 152, 157-58 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
96 Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 60 (2003). For a long list of cases in which prediction testimony has been held admissible,
see John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and
Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391,410 n.74 (2005).
97 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 938 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., specially concurring).
99 United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
lo People v. Taylor, 782 N.E.2d 920, 932 (I11. App. Ct. 2002); Collier v. State, 857 So. 2d 943, 945-46
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). See generally Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk
Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1459
& n.90 (2003).
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A noteworthy fact about the latter decisions is that almost all of them have
taken aim at the actuarial method, while continuing to permit clinical opinion,
despite its lesser accuracy. Ironically, these courts exempt traditional, more
speculative expert opinion from screening rules but are willing to subject
newer, more scientific testimony to Daubert or Frye analysis. To date, only
one court has concluded that clinical prediction testimony is so unreliable it
must be excluded; the force of this decision was undercut, however, by that
court's subsequent willingness to allow clinical opinion as long as it is
combined with actuarial findings.' 01
In short, the courts have paid virtually no attention to the critics' plea that
expert prediction testimony be barred or severely limited. No court has
pronounced a complete ban on expert prediction testimony. Those very few
cases where exclusion has occurred have usually involved actuarial-based
testimony, not more suspect clinical testimony. The rest of this Article
critiques these positions, looking in turn at each of the four components of
evidentiary analysis identified in the introduction: materiality, probative value,
helpfulness, and prejudicial impact.
III. MATERIALITY
If dangerousness is at issue-as it often is at sentencing, and always is in
criminal and civil commitment proceedings-the materiality, or logical
relevance, of prediction testimony would seem to be a foregone conclusion.
The issue is not that simple, however. Especially when, as is true for actuarial
prediction, the basis for the prediction is transparent, three types of questions
can be raised: First, is prediction that is based on studies of groups ever
applicable to a given individual? Second, assuming so, is the particular
prediction methodology used applicable to this particular individual? Third,
assuming so, is the prediction nonetheless immaterial because it relies on
factors that are not legally cognizable (such as race)?
101 Compare In re Care and Treatment of Coffel, 117 S.W.3d 116, 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (excluding
clinical prediction testimony), with In re Care and Treatment of Kapprelian, 168 S.W.3d 708, 715 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005) (distinguishing Coffel and admitting clinical testimony because the expert's opinion was not based
"solely on clinical judgment").
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A. Nomothetic Prediction Data
Justice Coyne of the Minnesota Supreme Court succinctly raised the first
issue in his dissenting opinion in In re Linehan: "Not only are . . . statistics
concerning the violent behavior of others irrelevant, but it seems to me wrong
to confine any person on the basis not of that person's own prior conduct but
on the basis of statistical evidence regarding the behavior of other people."
10 2
Assume that a person convicted of a sex offense-call him John-receives a
score of 21 on the VRAG. The most accurate characterization of this score is
that John shares a number of traits with a group of individuals, 76% of whom
are known to have engaged in violent recidivism. Justice Coyne's position is
that this information is immaterial in a proceeding to determine whether John
is dangerous, because it speaks of other people, not John. Mental health
professionals have long expressed similar concerns, with the psychologist
Gordon Allport making the following statement over sixty years ago:
A fatal nonsequitur occurs in the reasoning that if 80% of the
delinquents who come from broken homes are recidivists, then this
delinquent from a broken home has an 80% chance of becoming a
recidivist. The truth of the matter is that this delinquent has either
100% certainty of becoming a repeater or 100% certainty of going
straight. 103
Neither of these objections renders group-based predictions legally
immaterial, however. First, Justice Coyne mischaracterizes the nature of
prediction testimony, because a prediction based on research examining the
behavior of others can still be directly linked to the individual who is the
subject of the prediction. It is John's age, prior record, marital status, and
psychopathic personality traits that place him in the 76% recidivism category.
Moreover, these types of characteristics are all logically related to recidivism,
allowing us, as John Monahan has pointed out, to make "the inferential leap
from membership in a class that has in the past been violent to the prediction
that this member of the same class will in the future be violent."'0" While it is
true, as Allport's comment above notes, that any given individual either will or
will not offend, it is not incoherent to say that the VRAG score means there is
a 76% chance that John will recidivate. This type of statement is no different
in kind than an assertion that John probably committed a criminal act in the
past (even though he either did or did not) or a prediction, based on a clinical
102 In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 1994) (Coyne, J., dissenting).
103 GORDON ALLPORT, THE USE OF PERSONAL DOCUMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 156 (1942).
104 MONAHAN, supra note 71, at 66.
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 56 Emory L.J. 297 2006-2007
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
interview, that he is highly likely to reoffend, a type of statement that mental
health professionals make all the time. 1
05
The latter comparison suggests another reason why prediction testimony
cannot be considered immaterial simply because it is nomothetic in nature.
Such a position would prohibit not only actuarial prediction testimony but
clinical prediction testimony as well, and indeed would bar virtually any type
of opinion evidence from mental health professionals and similar experts,
because all of these opinions inherently are based on inferences drawn from
observation of other individuals. As I stated in my previous article:
While clinicians look at individual patterns, they do not do so in a
vacuum. Rather they make comparisons-sometimes implicit,
sometimes explicit-between these patterns and the patterns of other
individuals or groups of individuals that they know about through
experience, training, or education. In this regard, most clinical
predictions differ from actuarial ones only in the sense that the link
between past groups and present individuals is not statistically
correlated.
0 6
B. Nomothetic Prediction and Individual Cases
A willingness to permit reliance on predictions based on nomothetic
information does not necessarily mean that such predictions will be material in
every case. Much depends upon the extent to which the underlying data can be
generalized. Sometimes the group data may not be applicable to the individual
who is the subject of the prediction (the norming problem). Even if it is, it
may not address the question the law wants answered (the criterion variable
problem). Finally, even if it does answer the legal question, the prediction may
provide misleading information about the individual in question (the lack-of-
individualization problem). All of these points, which deal with what Daubert
called the "fit" issue,10 7 can be illustrated by the case of John, the hypothetical
offender introduced above.
105 Joseph T. McCann, Standards for Expert Testimony in New York Death Penalty Cases, 68 N.Y. ST. B.
J. 30, 30 (1996) (stating that in every one of the 144 capital cases in which Grigson testified up to 1992, he
stated he was sure the defendant would kill again).
106 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 126.
107 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) ("'Fit' is not always obvious, and scientific
validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes." (quoting United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985))).
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Recall that John's score on the VRAG is a 21, which supposedly indicates
a 76% chance of reoffending. But note that the VRAG was normed on a group
of mostly white offenders released from a maximum-security psychiatric
hospital in northern Ontario, Canada, in the 1970s.108 What if John is an
African-American sex offender in the United States at the present time? The
applicability of the VRAG data to his case is open to serious question. In fact,
the VRAG's AUC value when cross-validated on sex offenders is only .60.109
One commentator has suggested that this type of norming problem is "vast and
potentially insurmountable" and that without finely tuned cross-validation,
"absolute risk predictions based upon [actuarial instruments] are
meaningless."" 1
0
Second, in determining who in their sample population engaged in "violent
recidivism," researchers for the VRAG included not only those who committed
felonies, but also those who engaged in two or more simple assaults.ll" As a
result, the risk ratios reported by the developers of VRAG do not refer to the
probability of serious violence. This fact substantially reduces the materiality
of the VRAG score for capital sentencing and other contexts in which the legal
inquiry is usually focused on precisely that issue. Consider, for instance, how
a jury should interpret John's VRAG score of 21-even assuming it is
appropriately normed-if the question is whether John exhibits a "propensity
to commit murder that will probably constitute a continuing threat to society"
or a "probability that [he] would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society" (aggravating factors under the Idaho
and Texas capital statutes, respectively). "
2
Finally, as noted above, actuarial devices consider only a limited number of
variables. John's score on the VRAG does not take into account whether he is
undergoing treatment, is about to get married, has recently lost functioning in
one or more limbs, or has found religion. The proponents of the VRAG argue
108 QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 79, at 141.
109 Mamie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Cross- Validation and Extension of the Violence Risk Appraisal
Guide for Child Molesters and Rapists, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 235 tbl.2 (1997).
110 Donna Cropp Bechman, Sex Offender Civil Commitments: Scientists or Psychics?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 24,
29(2001).
111 Litwack, supra note 84, at 428.
112 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(i) (2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711 § 3(b)(2)
(Vernon 2006).
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that, based on their data, these factors are irrelevant.ll3 But their samples were
certainly not large enough to encompass statistically significant numbers of
every type of treatment or religious conversion experience or every type of
individual's reaction to these sorts of events. 14  Unless data exist
demonstrating that these factors do not lower the score of people like John,
reliance solely on the actuarial information might be inappropriate because
alone that inform-ation may be considered immaterial to John's propensity
toward violence.
These are all worthy concerns, but none should lead to wholesale exclusion
of prediction testimony. Difficulties concerning norming, criterion variables,
and lack of individualization can all be brought to the attention of the fact
finder. The subject of the prediction can also be given wide latitude to
question the generalizability of the research underlying the actuarial prediction
and suggest why that prediction may be off base in his or her case. With these
precautions, any weakness in the materiality of prediction testimony usually
can be exposed.
Sometimes, however, these difficulties-in combination or alone-will be
so significant that they should go to admissibility and not weight. Further
discussion of when that might occur is best left to analysis of the prejudice
factor in Part VI.
C. Illegitimate Bases for Prediction
The materiality of a prediction may be threatened not only by the factors it
does not consider, but also by the variables it does. At one time, racial traits
were considered a good predictor of behavior.'5 Currently, the gender and age
of the perpetrator play crucial roles in many prediction methodologies-
explicitly when the prediction is actuarial and implicitly when it is clinical.
Yet in many areas of the law, differentiating between individuals on the basis
of race, gender, and age often runs afoul of antidiscrimination principles, in
113 QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 79, at 177-78 ("[Tlhere is good evidence that clinicians' appraisals of
patients' current clinical conditions are unrelated to recidivism .... [lI]t is now clear that the 'getting to know'
individuals that occurs in typical interviews does not improve the prediction of behavior in any domain.").
114 Note, for instance, that none of the variables excluded by the VRAG researchers involved the factors
mentioned in the text or any of the other factors that were earlier hypothesized in discussing adjusted actuarial
assessments (e.g., treatment, gang membership, specific threats) or clinical variables (e.g., anger). Harris et
al., supra note 64, at 631 tbl. 1.
115 See MONAHAN, supra note 71, at 74-75.
[Vol. 56
HeinOnline  -- 56 Emory L.J. 300 2006-2007
DANGEROUSNESS AND EXPERTISE REDUX
large part because these are immutable characteristics that usually have very
little to do with any legitimate purpose. 6
Some commentators have gone further, suggesting that any characteristic of
an individual over which he or she has little or no control-diagnosis,
personality traits, abuse as a child-should be anathema as a basis for a
prediction. 1 7 In arguing that actuarial prediction should be barred from the
sentencing setting, Daniel Goodman put this point as follows:
It is a fundamental orthodoxy of our criminal justice system that the
punishment should fit the crime and the individual, not the statistical
history of the class of persons to which the defendant belongs. To
allow a criminal defendant's sentence to be determined to any degree
by his unchosen membership in a given [group] denies the very
premise of self-determination upon which our criminal justice system
is built. It raises the threat that defendants will be sentenced not only
on the basis of their personal merit or conduct, but on the basis of
their "status." 18
Others have echoed this view, with John Monahan recently arguing that "[p]ast
criminal behavior is the only scientifically valid risk factor for violence that
unambiguously implicates blameworthiness, and therefore the only one that
should enter the jurisprudential calculus in criminal sentencing." ' 19 If these
prescriptions are followed, then both actuarial and clinical prediction testimony
would be immaterial at capital and noncapital sentencing proceedings to the
extent that their predicate ventures beyond criminal history.
A first response to this argument is that even suspect classifications such as
race and gender are constitutionally permissible when they significantly further
a compelling government interest. 12  The identification of dangerous
individuals is a very important government interest, and gender and age, at
least, are extremely useful in making that determination. Race, on the other
116 See generally Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (stating "race, like
gender ... is an immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside" and thus
subject to constitutional protection under the Equal Protection Clause). One is also powerless to escape one's
age, although the Supreme Court has held that discrimination on the basis of relative youth-the type of
discrimination most relevant to violence prediction-is not cognizable under the Age Discrimination
Employment Act. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004).
117 See Daniel S. Goodman, Note, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 499,
521 (1987).
118 Id.
119 Monahan, supra note 96, at 428; see also Underwood, supra note 59, at 1416-17.
120 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378-79 (2d ed.
2005).
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hand, is not a particularly good predictor,' 21 and reliance on it for prediction
purposes should probably be barred in any event because of the societal and
symbolic repercussions such reliance would occasion.
1 22
A second and more important response is that when the government relies
on a dangerousness prediction to enhance a sentence, it is not pursuing
punishment based on blameworthiness and retribution, but rather is seeking
prevention based on assessment of risk, a completely different enterprise.
When the government is engaged solely in assessing blameworthiness for past
conduct, as is the case at trial, then Goodman and Monahan are correct in their
assertion that immutable factors should play no role. But at sentencing
proceedings in those states that view the goal of punishment as a mix of
retributive and other objectives, blameworthiness is not the only issue. For
instance, retributive considerations might be considered relevant only in setting
the outer limit of the sentence, with its precise length in a given case dependent
upon an evaluation of dangerousness and rehabilitative potential.123 In such
instances, limiting the basis of any prediction to factors that indicate
blameworthiness-such as prior crimes-is inconsistent with the purpose of
punishment.
What Goodman and Monahan are really saying is that dangerousness is not
a legitimate basis for a sentence. That is a defensible position. 24 But if one
accepts the substantive law as a given-as this Article does-and if the
relevant law permits sentences to be based on dangerousness-as is the case in
many states 25-it does not undermine the criminal justice system's "premise
121 MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 163 (showing a correlation between race and violence of. 12).
122 As I argued in a different context:
[A government] action which depends upon factors such as race denigrates the state's interest in
maintaining a democratic society and the allegiance of the populace .... Some citizens might
see the state's behavior as a justification for using race as a surrogate in their own decision
making. Other, more sensitive, citizens who experience or hear about such [actions] will
question the legitimacy not only of the [actions] themselves, but of the government that would
permit them. In either case, the democratic state's interests are severely damaged.
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 2, 85-86 (1991).
123 Norval Morris, Predicting Violence with Statistics, 34 STAN. L. REV. 249, 253 (1981).
124 See, e.g., Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1438 (2001) (arguing that desert and incapacitative principles are inherently
incompatible and that the latter principle should play no role in the criminal justice system, which should be
based entirely on desert).
125 Even many of the states with sentencing guidelines, which are normally an attribute of a desert-based
system, permit dangerousness assessments to influence the length of sentence, usually through a parole board
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of self-determination" (a premise that has already been honored at trial) to
permit predictions based on immutable or quasi-immutable factors.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, it is hardly protective of the individual's
interests to make prediction a sentencing issue and then deny the fact finder the
best means of making the prediction.
Monahan himself acknowledges the force of these points in concluding
that, outside the criminal setting, any prediction factor (other than race) is
material.126  Because blameworthiness is "irrelevant to imposing civil
hospitalization," for instance, Monahan would allow all risk factors to be
considered in that arena, which for him includes civil commitment and, to the
extent it is not punishment in disguise, sexual predator commitment.127 Given
governing law, this conclusion is clearly correct. In both commitment settings,
blameworthiness is clearly not at issue as far as the Supreme Court is
concerned.128 Thus, the principle of self-determination that the law seeks to
implement when blameworthiness is germane is not threatened by reliance on
unchangeable or difficult-to-change risk factors in commitment proceedings.
IV. THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF PREDICTION TESTIMONY
Probative value, as used here, is a measure of accuracy and is generally
considered a second aspect of relevancy (the first being materiality). 29
Prediction testimony may not be very accurate in an absolute sense, but it is
sufficiently accurate to meet the law's test of probativeness, whether that term
is defined in the traditional manner or in a Daubert sense. A separate, but
closely related, issue is whether prediction testimony, even if probative, can
ever be enough to satisfy the relevant standard of proof. Although not
technically an admissibility issue, a negative answer to this question could
result in exclusion as well, so it is considered here.
determination. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1200 (2005).
126 Monahan, supra note 96, at 429.
127 id.
128 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) (holding that sexual predator laws "[do] not
implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence").
129 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 276-77 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) ("There are two
components to relevant evidence: materiality and probative value .... [Materiality] looks to the relation
between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case ... [Plrobative value [is]
the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.").
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A. The Evidentiary Threshold
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is probative if it has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."'1 30  Expert prediction testimony, even if clinical in
nature, virtually always satisfies this test when dangerousness is the "fact" to
be determined. As explained in Part II, most expert prediction methodologies
produce predictions that exceed chance or random selection. Thus, assuming
no objection on materiality grounds, a prediction using these methodologies
makes a correct resolution of the dangerousness issue more probable than if the
prediction were made without reference to any evidence.
Critics of prediction testimony have been fond of comparing it unfavorably
to coin flipping, apparently on the assumption that the best possible false-
positive rate for such testimony is 50%.1 31 Even accepting that assumption, the
discussion in Part II should make clear why the coin flipping analogy does not
work. Experts who are wrong more than one out of two times are only
outdone by a coin toss when the base rate for harmful conduct is 50% or more.
Yet the base rate in the groups subject to prediction is seldom that high.1 32 As
the AUC values reported in Part II suggest, today's experts can correctly
identify those who will be violent at an accuracy rate-ranging from 45 to
75%-that is considerably higher than the base rate for violence within the
prediction group--usually in the 15 to 35% range. Thus, the coin-flipping
analogy is specious and misleading.
Nor is expert prediction testimony so unreliable that exclusion is required
under Daubert, despite that decision's focus on "error rates."'' 33 The main
thrust of Daubert is not that expert testimony should be admitted only when it
is provably accurate (a rule that would require exclusion of virtually all expert
testimony), but rather that its basis should be subjected to some sort of
verification process-preferably scientific in nature-so that it reflects "the
knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline."' 34 Thus, for instance,
Michael Saks, long an advocate for a rigorous interpretation of Daubert, has
nonetheless counseled against excluding expert evidence simply because "the
130 FED. R. EVID. 401.
131 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 931 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ennis & Litwack,
supra note 17, at 737.
132 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 113 n.61.
133 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
134 Id. at 592.
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witnesses practicing in that field assert erroneous conclusions with some
regularity."'' 35 As long as the fact finder is "informed about the likelihood of
error in the opinions, and the court [is] satisfied that the fact-finder is capable
of properly adjusting the weight to be given to the evidence," Saks would
permit such testimony.' 36 On this reasoning, even if research evidences false-
positive and false-negative rates well above 50%, material prediction
testimony derived from a methodology that does better than chance should be
admitted, as long as the relevant error rates are also provided to the fact finder.
Daubert additionally suggests that courts look at whether the methodology
employed by the expert is generally accepted among those in the relevant field.
This is, of course, also the inquiry required by the Frye test applicable in most
of the jurisdictions that have not adopted Daubert. This definition of probative
value may, at first glance, appear to pose more of a problem for prediction
testimony. As noted earlier, even though clinical prediction testimony has
been the mainstay of sentencing and commitment hearings for some time, the
relevant official organizations have expressed considerable concern about its
dependability, as have many adherents of the actuarial approach to
prediction.137 Nor has the latter methodology always escaped criticism under
Frye: At least one court has excluded actuarial prediction testimony because
only a small proportion of the relevant profession is familiar with it. 38
The fact remains that both methods of prediction are routinely used by
large segments of the mental health profession, in practice and in court. The
general acceptance notion cannot meaningfully be employed as a means of
determining whether prediction evidence, writ large, should be banned.
Rather, it is best used as a tool for ferreting out good and bad methods of
obtaining such evidence, consistent with Rule 703's requirement that the facts
or data forming the basis for expert testimony be "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field."'
139
In this regard, recall the contrast between the clinical prediction process
employed by Dr. Kozol and his associates and that of Dr. Grigson. When, as
135 Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially Fingerprint
Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2003).
136 Id.; see also Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
1047, 1048 (2003).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
138 Collier v. State, 857 So. 2d 943, 945-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see also I, re Valdez, No. 99-
000045CI (Fla. 2000) (reported in Otto & Petrila, supra note 94, at 5).
139 FED. R. EVID. 703.
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was the case with Grigson's testimony in Smith, the facts come from a short
interview with no attempt to obtain corroborative information, or, as was the
case with his testimony in Barefoot, the facts are taken entirely from a
hypothetical question, they should not be deemed "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field." As I argued previously, "such procedures do not,
on their face and according to most mental health professionals, appear to
afford adequate protection against inaccuracy."' 14  Similarly, there are
accepted and unacceptable ways of using actuarial instruments and structured
professional judgment.
An analysis of prediction testimony's probative value, then, reduces to two
simple prescriptions: First, a court should permit a mental health professional
to testify on the dangerousness issue only if it is established that he or she has
followed generally accepted assessment procedures that attempt to insure a
high degree of reliability, in both the social science and legal sense of the
word.' 4 1 Second, if the testimony is admitted, error rate information must be
provided to the fact finder, either through the expert or through some other
means. If these conditions are met, the testimony should be considered
sufficiently probative.
B. , Evidentiary Sufficiency
Conceptually separate from, but practically related to, the probative value
issue is the claim that prediction experts do not possess the ability to answer
the prediction questions the law asks. In capital sentencing cases,
dangerousness must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard of proof
that is also required by many sexual predator statutes. 42  In all other
commitment contexts, the Supreme Court has required that dangerousness be
proven by at least clear and convincing evidence. 43 If one adopts the standard
quantifications of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" as a 90 to 95% degree of
certainty and of "clear and convincing proof' as a 75% degree of confidence
(distinguishing both from the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard
used in civil cases, which is traditionally equated with a 51% level of
140 Slobogin, supra note I, at 134.
141 While the Supreme Court tends to use the word to mean accuracy-see Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993)-social scientists use it to mean inter-rater agreement or consistency.
See David H. Kaye & David A. Freeman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 331, 341 (1994).
142 See statutes cited supra note 26.
143 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
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certainty), prediction experts cannot, so the argument goes, satisfy the relevant
standard of proof, given their 50%-plus false-positive rate. If that is true, the
argument continues, there is no point in having them testify in the first place. 144
A first response to this argument is that it confuses the admissibility issue
with the sufficiency issue. As a leading evidence treatise states:
Whether the entire body of one party's evidence is sufficient to go to
the jury is one question. Whether a particular item of evidence is
relevant to the case is quite another . . . . Thus, the common
objection that the inference for which the fact is offered "does not
necessarily follow" is untenable. It poses a standard of
conclusiveness that very few single items of circumstantial evidence
ever could meet. A brick is not a wall.
145
One might note, however, that in a substantial majority of sentencing and
commitment cases, the expert prediction testimony is the entire body of
evidence. In such cases, the testimony is both the brick and the wall. Then
shouldn't the sufficiency and admissibility inquiries be merged?
If so, two other responses, one empirical and one legal, are possible. As an
empirical matter, expert prediction testimony could be said to meet the
sufficiency threshold (at least whenever the standard of proof is below the
reasonable doubt level) if, rather than looking at false-positive and false-
negative rates alone, we focus on their relationship to base rates. Specifically,
expert prediction testimony might be considered clear and convincing proof
any time the AUC value for the methodology in question is .75 or higher.
Recall that such a value means that, given two randomly selected individuals,
one drawn from the population of people who reoffend and the other drawn
from the population of people who do not, there is a 75% chance that the
methodology at issue will designate the violent individual a higher risk than
the nonviolent individual.
The legal response to the sufficiency problem is to define "dangerousness"
in such a way that error rates are minimized. For instance, many state
commitment laws provide that a person is "dangerous" when he or she is
144 Cf Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the
Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 74-76 (1982) (arguing that a high number of unjus, incarcerations
probably result from the uncertainty of prediction).
145 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 129, at 278.
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"likely" or "substantially likely" to harm another. 146  If the word "likely" is
equated with a 51% probability, then proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a
person is dangerous under this definition would only require a 46% likelihood
(.90 x .51) that the person will harm another. Even clinical prediction
testimony can produce such proof of a "definite maybe," as Monahan and
Wexler aptly describe this way of combining the standard of proof with the
legal standard of dangerousness. 147  Other legal responses to the sufficiency
problem include requiring a heightened standard of proof only for the relevant
risk factors (e.g., two prior crimes, abuse as a child) 148 or for the person's
particular risk level (whether it be high, moderate, or low). 149
All of these ploys may strike some readers as sleights of hand. The tension
between society's urge to confine those who will harm others and its inability
to identify precisely who these people are is not easily resolved. At bottom,
the lack-of-sufficiency argument is an attack on dangerousness as a legal
criterion, not an argument about admissibility. I have previously contended
that, in many settings, lowering the standard of proof when dangerousness is
the issue is normatively justifiable and consistent with our current criminal
justice jurisprudence. 50  But one can also sensibly conclude that, given the
myriad proof problems, dangerousness should be eliminated as a ground for
liberty deprivation. For purposes of this Article, the substantive point will
simply be recognized and left at large.
146 See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 954 (Cal. 2002) (holding that commitment
under California's sexual predator law does not require proof of a "better than even" chance of violence but
only proof of "substantial danger-that is, a serious and well-founded risk-of criminal sexual violence").
147 John Monahan & David B. Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38 (1978). A normative argument for this approach might be based on the idea that, in
some contexts, such as sexual predator cases, we will put up with many more false positives than false
negatives, given the relative costs of the first--erroneous confinement until the next hearing-and the
second-one or more rapes or child molestations. See generally Richard Berk et al., Developing a Practical
Forecasting Screener for Domestic Violence Incidents, 29 EvAL. REV. 358, 368-70 (2005).
148 Cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(2) (2005) (requiring "proof beyond a reasonable doubt with
respect to any physical facts or evidence," while requiring only "clear and convincing evidence as to all other
matters").
149 Cf. Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive
Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 792 (1996) (arguing that even when risk is low, if the detained
person belongs to the designated risk group, "there is a one hundred percent chance that person presents a risk
of harm").
150 Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 6-9, 53-58 (2003).
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V. THE HELPFULNESS OF PREDICTION TESTIMONY
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the evidence rules of virtually
every state, a witness may not testify as an "expert" unless his or her testimony
"assists" or is "helpful" to the fact finder.' 5 1 The courts have paid very little
attention to this requirement in evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony
on dangerousness. In theory, however, helpfulness could be evaluated directly
and empirically, assuming the ability to measure the accuracy of a prediction.
A test of incremental validity in the prediction context would simply compare
the accuracy of predictions made by experts with the accuracy of predictions
made by judges and juries unassisted by experts.
To date, no such direct comparison has been made. Several commentators
have speculated that, given the inaccuracy of prediction experts, lay people
could do just as well as the professionals, at least when compared to decisions
using the clinical methodology for prediction. 152 More concretely, an analysis
of the earliest studies on prediction efficacy concluded that "a nonclinician
furnished with knowledge of past behavior may outperform a mental health
professional relying solely on information garnered from a clinical
interview." 1
53
If these observations are borne out, clinical prediction testimony might not
be sufficiently helpful to be admissible. In the meantime, however, common
sense suggests that such testimony can, under certain conditions, be very useful
to laypeople inexperienced with prediction. In particular, clinical prediction
testimony can apprise them of potential risk factors they would not otherwise
contemplate. It is unlikely, for instance, that jurors will be able to discern how
a particular person reacts to stress and what types of stress are most likely to
trigger violence in that person without some explanation by a qualified
clinician. 154
151 FED. R. EviD. 702.
152 See ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 33 (1975) ("[In]
many ... situations a lay person can predict dangerousness at least as well as a professional." For example,
"drug addicts who regularly support their habit by mugging."); Morse, supra note 17, at 620 (reasoning that
"[w]ithout hard, methodologically sound quantitative data, the guess of an expert is unlikely to be better than
the guess of laypersons"); see also Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Admissibility of Expert
Testimony Based upon Clinical Judgment and Scientific Research, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1226, 1228
(1998) ("expert judgments that are clinically derived, as opposed to actuarially derived, are as susceptible to
error as lay judgments").
153 Mossman, supra note 78, at 790.
154 See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 136 (citing Morse, supra note 17, at 600-26).
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As this last caveat suggests, however, only clinical prediction testimony
that is based on factors derived from the risk literature should be considered
helpful. Most mental health professionals are trained to diagnose and treat
mental disorder, not predict harmful behavior.' 55 As George Dix has argued, a
clinician who does not have a good grasp of the research literature on risk
assessment should not be permitted to offer a clinical prediction of
dangerousness, even if other standard educational or experiential requirements
are met.15 6  Clinicians like Dr. Kozol are much more likely to meet these
threshold requirements than someone like Dr. Grigson, whose testimony is not
only deficient for the procedural reasons suggested above, but also because it
often consisted of little more than a bow to the type of past behavior that
laypeople can evaluate for themselves. Grigson himself appeared to agree with
this negative assessment of his "expertise." As he told a journalist, "I think
you could do away with the psychiatrist in these cases. Just take any man off
the street, show him what the guy's done, and most of these things are so clear-
cut he would say the same things I do."'
157
Compared to clinical prediction, actuarial and structured professional
judgment assessments are more clearly useful to lay fact finders. Both are
explicitly based on the risk literature. The specific probability estimates they
provide are also beyond the ken of laypeople. Assuming such assessments are
material and probative, as those terms were defined in earlier discussion, they
are undoubtedly helpful as well.
Whether based on clinical or actuarial information, however, prediction
testimony that goes beyond identifying risk factors and probability estimates to
assert that a person is "dangerous," a "continuing threat to society," or
"committable"-in other words, prediction testimony that addresses the
ultimate legal issue-is not helpful. 158  The determination as to whether a
person presents a risk to society sufficient to justify indeterminate
commitment, a lengthier sentence, or the death penalty is solely legal in nature,
115 See id. at 129.
156 George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness," Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics,
5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 175-77 (1977).
157 John Bloom, Killers and Shrinks, TEx. MONTHLY, July 1978, at 68. For the reasons suggested in the
text, Dr. Grigson's career as a prosecution witness was sharply curtailed in 1995, when he was expelled from
the American Psychiatric Association. Hugh Aynesworth, Texas "Dr. Death" Retires After 167 Capital Case
Trials, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at A2.
158 See FED. R. EVID. 702, 704 (Rule 704 permits expert testimony on the "ultimate issue," but Rule 702
requires that such testimony be based on "specialized knowledge" that will "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence.").
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dependent upon many factors other than those having to do with risk. For
instance, a 20% probability that a person will harm others might justify short-
term civil commitment but not the death penalty. Other potential legal
variables include the magnitude of the harm predicted (rape vs. simple assault),
its frequency, and its imminence. 159 Mental health professionals might be able
to provide helpful information on each of these points, but they have no
specialized insight into whether that information authorizes deprivation of life
or liberty; thus they cannot assist the fact finder on that ultimate issue.
Mental health professionals can sometimes helpfully address the
penultimate issue-that is, whether an individual is "likely" or "substantially
likely" to harm another-because that question is an empirical one. However,
it is incumbent on the mental health professional to define what he or she
means when using these types of terms. Furthermore, if such testimony is not
associated with a specific probability estimate based on actuarial data or
structured professional judgment, then it should usually be barred as unduly
prejudicial for reasons developed in the next Part.
VI. THE PREJUDICIAL NATURE OF CLINICAL PREDICTION TESTIMONY
In his dissent in Barefoot, Justice Blackmun explained why he was
unwilling to permit capital sentencing juries to hear expert prediction
testimony (as opposed to lay testimony about past conduct): "[T]he specious
testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the
inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death
itself."160 Judge Garza, the lone Fifth Circuit judge willing to endorse Justice
Blackmun's prohibition of prediction testimony, expressed similar concerns
about its prejudicial impact: "[W]hen a medical doctor testifies that 'future
dangerousness' is a scientific inquiry on which [he has] particular expertise,
and testifies that a particular defendant would be a 'continuing threat to
society,' juries are almost always persuaded."'161
Of course, the potent influence that Justice Blackmun and Judge Garza
attribute to prediction experts would not be a significant concern if the experts
were correct most or all of the time. But the research literature makes clear
159 See ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 680 (1974)
(listing magnitude, probability, frequency, and imminence as four interrelated factors that should be
considered in determining dangerousness).
160 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161 Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring).
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that they are not.162 If Judge Garza's assertion that lay decision makers are
"almost always persuaded" by expert prediction testimony is true, solid ground
for exclusion would exist.
The Barefoot majority dismissed this concern, confident that the adversary
system is "competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of
[prediction testimony's] shortcomings."' 163  Aided by this process, Justice
White contended on behalf of the majority, the fact finder will be able to
"separate the wheat from the chaff."'164  There is good reason to believe,
however, that Justice Blackmun and Judge Garza are correct and Justice White
is wrong about the effect of prediction testimony in an adversarial proceeding,
at least when it is clinical in nature.
As the Barefoot majority noted, cross-examination and rebuttal experts are
usually viewed as adequate means of exposing the shortcomings of an expert
witness. 165 For instance, the weaknesses of psychiatric testimony supporting
an insanity defense can be exposed through vigorous questioning and
countering expert opinions. But culpability testimony and prediction
testimony differ from one another in a crucial way-one that significantly
undermines the efficacy of adversarial techniques in the latter situation.
Culpability testimony is proffered by a criminal defendant who has admitted,
explicitly or implicitly, the commission of a crime and who must fight de jure
or de facto presumptions of sanity and intentionality.' 66 The state's burden on
rebuttal is substantially eased by the natural skepticism that such a setting
elicits, and thus its use of adversarial techniques is likely to have some success.
Prediction testimony, in contrast, is introduced by the government, either at
sentencing, which directly follows conviction for a criminal offense, or at a
commitment hearing, which is also preceded by a violent act of some sort. In
this type of situation, the defense's case in rebuttal is a much tougher sell.
Advocates against the state's position must convince the fact finder that the
individual will not do again what he or she has just done.
Of course, sentencing and commitment are not the only proceedings in
which a litigant must overcome a mindset favoring the government; a criminal
trial, initiated by a formal charge against the defendant, is another obvious
162 See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
163 463 U.S. at 899.
'64 Id. at 901 n.7.
165 Id. at 898.
166 See Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 105,
109-10 (2003).
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example. But the potential pro-state bias at criminal trials is counteracted by
the presumption of innocence and the high standard of proof and can be further
combated with concrete evidence that the defendant did not commit the
claimed act or that someone else did. Prediction settings are vastly different:
No presumption of safeness exists, either as a legal matter or in the minds of
the decision makers; the quantum of proof demanded of the state in sentencing
and commitment hearings, in practice, seldom approaches that required at trial,
for reasons developed above; and demonstrating that a person will not act a
certain way in the future is a much more problematic enterprise than proving
he or she did not act a certain way in the past.
To these general points of concern can be added disquieting conjectures
about the likely efficacy of specific rebuttal techniques. One might expect that
providing the fact finder with information about false-positive rates (which I
argued above should always occur) would diminish any tendency to hold the
state expert's opinion in undue regard. That practice, while important, fails to
counteract the well-known "representativeness heuristic," which leads people
to give significantly more weight to case-specific information than to
generalized statistics. 167 Fact finders can tell themselves, in many cases quite
plausibly, that despite the overall high false-positive rates associated with
dangerousness predictions, the state's experts are right this time. Introduction
of case-specific information through a rebuttal expert could, in theory, redress
that problem. But if, as is often the case when offenders or respondents are
indigent, there is no opposing expert, 168 or the expert can, in candor, do little
more than identify a few protective factors meant to rebut the state's risk
factors, then this stratagem will be unavailing as well. The one study directly
on point found that even strong cross-examination and an opposing expert do
167 Saks and Kidd note that the "consistent overprediction of dangerousness is in part due to experts'
insensitivity to the low frequency of such behavior and reliance on the representativeness heuristic wherein the
person threatened with commitment is compared to the stereotype of a dangerous person." Michael J. Saks &
Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc' Y REV.
123, 133 (1980) (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430 (1972)). If experts do not respond to generalized data, it is
unlikely that laypersons will.
168 At the time of Barefoot's trial, for instance, indigent defendants in death penalty cases in Texas were
entitled to $500 for "investigation and experts." 463 U.S. at 899 n.5. The Supreme Court has held that
indigent defendants are entitled to state-paid assistance on the dangerousness issue, but only to one such
expert, who can be a state employee and who does not have to agree with the defense position. Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985).
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not shake the influence of a state expert willing to pronounce the defendant
dangerous. 169
Also suggestive of clinical prediction's power are data on the outcome of
proceedings in which it is offered. A survey of hearings under a Maryland
criminal commitment program found that, despite the fact that the staff's
prediction of dangerousness was virtually always "contested" (albeit not
always by opposing experts), judges agreed with its recommendations in 88%
of the cases.170 Similarly, only 31 (or 12%) of the 257 patients that Kozol and
his staff originally diagnosed as dangerous were released by the courts, 171
many for reasons having nothing to do with perceived risk. 172  And Texas
capital sentencing juries virtually never disagreed with Dr. Grigson's clinical
predictions, despite cross-examination and rebuttal experts. 173 At least in these
cases, Judge Garza appears to be right that lay fact finders are "almost always
persuaded" by clinical prediction testimony proffered by the state: 174 a
conclusion that is particularly troubling given the very low likelihood that the
judges and juries involved in them were correct in concluding that more than
85% of the individuals they committed or sentenced to death would have
reoffended if released.1
75
One might be tempted to explain these results simply as a demonstration
that, when given the opportunity, laypeople will almost always conclude that
offenders and individuals subject to commitment are dangerous, regardless of
whether experts confirm that view. In contrast to the above data, however,
research focusing on the impact of actuarial prediction suggests that the latter
type of testimony is much less likely to sway judges and juries. For instance,
concordance between the government's expert witnesses and the ultimate
169 Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
17, 38-41 & tbl.4 (1996). Diamond and colleagues found that only when the government expert admitted that
he might be wrong two out of three times did study subjects tend to change their minds. Id.
170 See Bert H. Hoff, Patuxent and Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, 5 BULL. AM. ACAo.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 144, 154 (1977).
171 See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 147 n.182 (citing Kozol et al., supra note 31, at 378).
172 George E. Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the "Dangerousness" of "Normal" Criminal Defendants, 66
VA. L. REV. 523, 540-41 (1980).
173 According to one report, Grigson "has testified for the prosecution in at least 140 Texas capital trials;
jurors imposed death sentences in more than 98 percent of these cases." AMNESTY INT'L, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN TEXAS: LETHAL INJUSTICE 18 (1998), http://web.amnesty.orglibrary/pdf/
AMR510101998ENGLISH/$File/AMR5101098.pdf.
174 Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 2000).
175 One study found that only 21% of those sentenced to death as dangerous by Texas jurors committed
any type of violent act while in prison. James W. Marquart et al., Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors
Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 L. & SoC'Y REV. 449, 463 (1989).
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decision in sexual predator proceedings, where actuarial testimony
predominates, is much lower than 85%. 176 Numerous studies have confirmed
that clinical prediction testimony is more persuasive to lay decision makers
than actuarial testimony, 177 despite the latter's superior accuracy.' 78  Of
particular import, given the debate in Barefoot about the usefulness of the
adversary process, is a study finding not only that "jurors weigh clinical
opinion expert testimony more heavily than actuarial expert testimony," but
that "adversarial procedures may be insufficient to remove this bias."' 179  A
second study confirmed that, while cross-examination of clinical testimony has
little impact on dangerousness ratings, cross-examination of actuarial
testimony does reduce those ratings.'
80
These findings make sense. Cross-examination and rebuttal experts who
attack the risk factors underlying clinical prediction testimony will, at best, be
able to suggest in some vague way that the subject is a lower risk than the
state's expert believes. In contrast, when risk factors are associated with a
precise probability of recidivism, as occurs under the actuarial approach, cross-
examination and rebuttal can suggest in more concrete terms how that
probability will be lowered if particular factors are not present or particular
protective factors are present. Laypeople may also be less likely to give in to
their pre-existing inclination to find offenders and commitment respondents
dangerous when the expert says, "this person belongs to a group that re-offends
at a [particular] rate," rather than simply pronounces that the person is "a high
risk" or is "likely to re-offend."
The implications of these observations and research findings are twofold:
First, the government should not be permitted to introduce clinical prediction
testimony in its case-in-chief. Contrary to the assertion of the Barefoot
majority, the adversarial process cannot expose effectively the shortcomings of
176 See Fitch & Hammen, supra note 2, at 32 (indicating that, between 1999 and 2001, only 473
individuals had been committed under sexual predator laws, despite several thousand petitions for such
commitments).
177 Daniel A. Krauss & Dae H. Lee, Deliberating on Dangerousness and Death: Jurors' Ability to
Differentiate Between Expert Actuarial and Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness, 26 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 113, 115-16 (2003).
178 Randy Borum, Improving the Clinical Practice of Violence Risk Assessment, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
945, 946 (1996); William Gardner et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Predictions of Violence in Patients with
Mental Illness, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 602 (1996).
179 Daniel A. Krauss & Brce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony on Juror
Decision Making in Capital Cases, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 267, 305 (2001).
180 Daniel A. Krauss et al., The Effects of Rational and Experiential Information Processing of Expert
Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, 22 BEHAV. Sa. & L. 801, 814 (2004).
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this type of opinion evidence, with the result that lay decision makers give it
too much weight. In short, the prejudicial impact of clinical expert testimony
proffered by the state is greater than its relatively low probative value, and thus
should lead to its exclusion.
The same balancing analysis suggests the opposite result, however, when
the government seeks to introduce prediction testimony tied to empirically
based probability estimates associated with actuarial assessment and some
structured professional judgment instruments. As earlier parts of this Article
demonstrated, the latter type of testimony is both more probative and more
helpful than clinical prediction testimony.'81 And, as just discussed, testimony
based on empirically derived risk estimates is not as likely to be misused by
the fact finder. Perhaps, given its quantified nature, laypeople are better able
to judge the true import of such testimony, or perhaps they are simply more
distrustful of information in the form of data than information that tells an
individualized story about the subject of the prediction.' 82 Whatever its cause,
this differential impact on the fact finder leads to the conclusion that the
govemment should be able to use such testimony in its case-in-chief.
VH. THE SUBJECT-FIRST REGIME
The foregoing analysis does not require a complete ban on clinical
prediction testimony. The offender-respondent (hereafter the subject) should
still be able to use clinical prediction to undermine the state's claim that he or
she is a menace to society. Although clinical prediction testimony is less
probative and less helpful than testimony that reports empirically based risk
estimates, it is also less likely to have a prejudicial impact when it is proffered
by the subject as opposed to the state. That is because, when proffered by the
subject, prediction testimony is aimed at dispelling preconceptions, not feeding
them. Under such circumstances, it is much less likely to overinfluence the
fact finder.
A second reason for this "subject-first" position is that the subjects of
prediction hearings should not be prevented from telling the best story they can
about their future. Indeed, their interest in advancing their unique case may be
entitled to constitutional status. In Rock v. Arkansas,183 the Supreme Court
181 See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
182 See Krauss & Sales, supra note 179, at 301.
'8' 483 U.S. 44(1987).
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held that both the Sixth Amendment right to present evidence and the Due
Process Clause dictate that testimony proffered by criminal defendants be
admitted unless it "is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional
means of evaluating credibility that it should disable a defendant from
presenting her version of the events for which she is on trial."' 184  Although
Rock focused on the right of the criminal defendant to testify, it has come to
stand for the broader proposition that the Constitution guarantees the accused
the right, in Rock's words, "to present his own version of events." 185 Because
Rock relied on the Due Process Clause as well as the Sixth Amendment, its
reasoning should apply to civil proceedings as well as the "criminal
prosecutions" referred to in the latter amendment. Thus, unless demonstrably
unreliable or "immune" to adversarial testing, both clinical and actuarial
prediction testimony should be admissible when presented by the defense in
any type of proceeding.
Under a subject-first regime, that option would be available, although
choosing it would open the door to rebuttal using the same kind of evidence.
When the state's actuarial evidence is weak, subjects are unlikely to opt for
this strategy. When it is strong, they are more likely to do so, arguing, in
effect, that the statistical estimates should be adjusted downward in light of
personal characteristics that the actuarial analysis did not take into account.
As I noted in my previous article,' 86 the subject-first approach has a time-
honored analogue in the character evidence rule. 187 Recognized in some form
in every state and the federal courts, this rule prohibits the prosecution from
introducing evidence concerning the defendant's character in a criminal trial
unless the defendant does it first. The rule's prohibition is motivated by the
same concerns that were just raised in connection with clinical prediction
184 Id. at6l.
185 Id. at 52. For elaboration of this point, see Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by
Jury and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom
About Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621, 636-37 (1998); Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth
Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1275, 1316-50; and
Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information in Criminal Trials: From
Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &L. 100, 114-17 (1999).
186 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 149-50.
187 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (1) Character of
accused-Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same .... "). Indeed, the advisory committee note to the federal character evidence rule states that the rule "is
so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional proportions ... FED. R. EvID.
404(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
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testimony. Although evidence of bad character shows that the defendant has a
tendency to commit bad acts and thus might have committed the current crime,
its probative value is thought to be outweighed by the possibility that the fact
finder will convict the defendant merely because he or she has been a bad
person, rather than because the state has proved its case.' 88 Thus, negative
character evidence is barred unless the defendant decides that there is enough
evidence of good character to counteract it. 189 Analogously, because the risk is
great that clinical prediction testimony, although probative of dangerousness,
will prompt an erroneous prediction, its introduction should be prohibited
unless the subject opens the door to its use.
Accordingly, as I stated in my previous article, "the character evidence rule
serves as a well-established precedent for the type of rule proposed here."
' ' 90
There are, however, some unique conceptual and practical issues that arise in
applying the analogous subject-first rule to clinical dangerousness testimony.
The following three sections explore the most important of these issues.
A. The Type of Evidence the State May Use to Prove Dangerousness
Without clinical predictions, the state will be deprived of a primary means
of proving dangerousness. But, for the reasons outlined above, it may still rely
on empirically based risk estimates that are material to the case. As indicated
in Parts II and III, for some populations and some types of harmful behavior,
material statistical information is scarce. Thus, courts sometimes will have to
make difficult decisions as to whether a risk estimate derived from an actuarial
instrument normed on a dissimilar population or using a definition of harm that
varies from the applicable legal standard can reasonably be extrapolated to
cover the case at hand.
If not, the state should still be able to introduce lay evidence describing
prior antisocial acts. The strong consensus of the risk literature is that the
number and type of prior violent acts committed by an individual are the
factors most germane to a prediction of future behavior. 19 1  The type of
188 See Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 99, 104-05 (1996).
189 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948) ('The overriding policy of excluding such
evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent
confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.").
190 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 149.
191 Id. at 151-52; see also MONAHAN, supra note 71, at 71 ("If there is one finding that overshadows all
others in the area of prediction, it is that the probability of future crime increases with each prior criminal
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proceeding involved will dictate the type of prior acts that might be considered.
Thus, if, as the Supreme Court suggested in Jones v. United States, larceny is
dangerous behavior in the context of insanity acquittee commitment, 192 then
evidence of past thefts would be admissible in such proceedings. 193 On the
other hand, such evidence would presumably not be admissible in a capital
sentencing proceeding where the focus is the defendant's potential for
committing serious bodily harm in the future. 194  Courts will also have to
decide, as they do now in sentencing and other contexts, whether evidence
short of conviction for an offense is sufficient proof of a particular prior bad
act. 195
Finally, of course, if the subject opts to use clinical prediction testimony,
the state may do so as well. This follows from the analogy to the character
evidence rule, as well as general fairness principles.
B. When the Subject Opens the Door
Determining when the subject should be said to have "opened the door" to
state use of clinical prediction will not always be easy. Certainly, if the
defense puts a clinician such as Dr. Kozol on the stand to discuss risk factors,
the state may respond in kind. At the same time, the defense should be able to
respond in kind to both actuarial-type prediction testimony and lay testimony
about past acts without fear of triggering state use of clinical prediction
evidence. But other scenarios present harder questions.
act."); Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME & JUST. 303, 316-
17 (1997) ("Research on the prediction of criminal behavior has repeatedly demonstrated criminal record to be
the single best predictor of future offending.").
192 463 U.S. 354, 364-65 (1983).
193 Id. at 365 n.14 ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse
danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the
purpose of the statute is the same as to both." (quoting Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir.
1961))).
'94 Id. at 152.
195 After the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), sentencing
courts are no longer permitted to rely on evidence of prior bad acts to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory
or guidelines maximum unless they resulted in conviction, are stipulated to by the defense, or were found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. It remains to be seen whether this rule applies in commitment hearings,
where the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in criminal cases-the basis for the Apprendi ruling-probably
does not apply.
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In criminal commitment proceedings, a commonly contested threshold
issue is whether the subject is mentally disordered. 196  Because this issue
focuses on present mental state, defense use of a mental health professional to
address it should not authorize state use of clinical prediction testimony. In
sexual predator commitment proceedings, however, the issue of whether the
subject has a "mental abnormality" is often explicitly defined in terms of
whether the condition "predisposes" the individual to commit further violent
acts. 197 If the defense decides to use a clinician to address this subject, it is in
effect introducing clinical prediction testimony. In such situations, the state
should be entitled to respond in similar fashion.
A second, closely related issue that arises in sexual predator proceedings
(and perhaps in other commitment proceedings as well) is whether the subject
is volitionally impaired. This inquiry appears to be mandated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks,'98 which upheld sexual predator
commitment on condition that the state show that the individual is dangerous
"beyond [his or her] control." 199 This language implies that the state must
produce some evidence of impulsivity or undeterrability in order to commit
under these laws. z°° Although one's propensity to act impulsively might be
distinguishable, in a technical sense, from one's dangerousness, the two
concepts are so closely related that, once again, a defense decision to use a
clinician on the former issue should permit the state to use a clinician to
address either or both.
A third potential door-opening scenario involves sentencing. In sentencing
proceedings, particularly capital sentencing proceedings, offenders frequently
present clinical evidence about culpability in an attempt to mitigate the
disposition. Thus, a defense witness might testify that the subject was
suffering extreme mental or emotional distress at the time of the offense or was
196 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 916.15(1) (West 2006) (requiring a showing of "mental illness" as a predicate
for commitment of insanity acquittees).
197 See, e.g., KAN. PROB. CODE. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West 2006) (defining "mental abnormality" as a
"congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person
to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of
others").
198 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
199 Id. at 358.
200 1 have argued that Hendricks should be construed to require true "undeterrability," i.e., a showing that
the individual will commit violent acts even when the likelihood of apprehension and significant punishment is
very high. Slobogin, supra note 150, at 40-48.
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unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her criminal acts.2° 1 This
testimony often will be based on precisely the same type of information an
anamnestic approach to clinical prediction might collect. Here, however, the
defense's expert is clearly focused on past mental state and culpability issues,
not future acts and dangerousness. Such testimony should not authorize state
use of clinical prediction testimony.
Finally, both criminal commitment and sentencing proceedings frequently
202focus on the treatability of the subject. This scenario is the most difficult to
resolve in a subject-first regime. As I noted in my previous article:
Both dangerousness and treatability assessments involve predictions;
when the defense introduces clinical evidence based on the latter type
of assessment, it is often suggesting that the individual either is not
dangerous or will not be so for long, given proper treatment.
Frequently, however, such testimony may be directed purely at the
efficacy of specific therapeutic modalities in treating problems that
are not related to past behavior (such as depression or vocational
deficiencies). [Accordingly, when clinical testimony about
treatability is proffered by the subject] the court would need to make
a sensitive appraisal of the testimony's scope in order to determine
whether the state should be able to use clinical prediction
evidence.
20 3
As an efficiency mechanism, the defense could be required, analogous to
204
common practice with respect to testimony on insanity, to give notice to the
state and the court whenever it is contemplating using a clinician at criminal
commitment or sentencing. In that way, door-opening issues can be sorted out
prior to adjudication, and the state can prepare accordingly. Even with this
adjustment, a subject-first regime should not involve a major shake-up of
current defense practice. Defense use of clinicians on mental abnormality and
volitional impairment issues in commitment hearings is and probably will
201 For instance, roughly two thirds of state capital sentencing statutes recognize these two conditions as
mitigating factors. Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296-98 (1989).
202 See, e.g., ALBERT J. DATZ, A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-7.4(d), at 419 (1989) ("If the court is persuaded that acquittee will continue to
receive the needed treatment or habilitation, it may order ... that acquittee be released .... "); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 7.01(2)0) (mitigation possible if "the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to
probationary treatment").
203 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 155-56.
204 Every jurisdiction requires the defense to provide notice of intent to raise an insanity defense. WAYNE
R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 919 (2d ed. 1999).
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remain rare, and when the defense does decide to have a clinician testify on
those issues, it will probably also want the prediction issue addressed; so, the
door will be opened in any event. A similar coincidence of aims will usually
be present when treatability is at issue. If not, the defense may often be able to
structure the clinician's testimony about treatability so that it does not address
dangerousness.
C. When the State May Use a Clinician on Other Issues
The state's prerogatives with respect to experts should mirror the subject's
even on issues other than dangerousness. If the defense uses an expert to
address dangerousness issues in disguise (predisposing mental abnormality,
volitional impairment, or treatability), the state should be able to do so as well.
However, if the defense chooses not to use an expert on dangerousness or these
related subjects, the state should not be able to so either. Instead, the state
would have to rely on empirically derived probability estimates or lay
testimony to address these issues.
The one exception to this rule, consistent with what was said above in
connection with the defense's prerogatives, is that the government should be
able to present clinical testimony about treatability when it does not directly
implicate dangerousness. For instance, in an insanity acquittee commitment
hearing, the state should be able to introduce clinical evidence showing that, if
the subject is found to be dangerous, treatment would be most efficacious in an
inpatient unit rather than on an outpatient basis.205 It also bears iteration that,
when considering the treatability issue, the state would always be permitted to
present both appropriately normed hard actuarial data on the prognosis for
similarly situated patients and information about the particular person's own
prior treatment successes or failures, analogous to the actuarial and lay proof of
risk that the state is always permitted to adduce.
VIII. CIVIL COMMITMENT
The prohibition on state use of clinical prediction testimony in its case-in-
chief and the associated subject-first rule, which I have argued should govern
205 Cf. DATZ, supra note 202, § 7-7.4(d) (providing that if the court finds that the only reason an insanity
acquittee does not meet the commitment criteria is because of the effect of treatment or habilitation, "the
acquittee may be committed unless the court is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the
acquittee will continue to receive such treatment or habilitation following release for as long as the treatment
or habilitation is required").
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sentencing and criminal commitment, probably should not apply to civil
commitment, at least at the front end. My previous article identified two
reasons for this position: one practical and one evidentiary.
20 6
The practical reason is simply that the proposed regime could probably not
be implemented in the emergency commitment setting. A person with mental
illness who is evaluated moments after threatening to kill his spouse should not
be allowed to go free while the information necessary to make an actuarial or
structured professional judgment is collected. In this situation, mental health
professionals will have to use their best clinical judgment in deciding
immediately whether hospitalization is warranted. °7 Given these exigencies,
state use of clinical predictions of dangerousness and treatability may be
unavoidable. Nor would there be time for the defense to assess its options and
give pretrial notice of the type proposed above.
The second reason evidentiary restrictions on prediction testimony might
be relaxed in the emergency commitment setting is that the prediction called
for in such situations is likely to be more accurate than the long-term
predictions that have been the focus of discussion to this point. John Monahan
has summarized the theoretical grounds for this assertion as follows:
In emergency commitment . . . there is a small situational and
temporal "gap" between the behavior used as a predictor and the
outcome that is being predicted. One is directly sampling actions,
e.g., threatening words and gestures, that are "as similar as possible
to the behavior used on criterion measures," e.g., fulfilled threats. In
violence as in other areas, it is potentially true that "predictions about
individual behavior can be generated accurately from knowledge of
the environments in which the behavior occurs.
'208
209If in fact, as research to date suggests, clinical predictions based on recent
behavior in the community can provide "clear and convincing proof' that the
206 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 172-74.
207 Scherr, supra note 96, at 15-16.
208 See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 174 (citing MONAHAN, supra note 71, at 59 (quoting WALTER MISCHEL,
PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 164 (1968))).
209 L. Joy Apperson et al., supra note 73, at 1378-79 (finding a 25% false-positive rate for short-term
predictions in emergency commitment context); Ren~e L. Binder, Are the Mentally Ill Dangerous?, 27 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 189, 197 (1999) (summarizing research indicating that short-term predictions are
better than long-term predictions); Ethan S. Rofman et al., The Prediction of Dangerous Behavior in
Emergency Civil Commitment, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1061, 1063 (1980) (producing a 59% faise-positive rate
but noting that those predicted to be dangerous were immediately medicated and thus that "the probability of
the patients in [the] experimental group (who would be unmedicated outside the hospital) committing assaults
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individual will behave violently in the near future, the rationale for the subject-
first rule is significantly weakened in connection with front-end commitments.
As I noted in my previous article, however, "both the practical and
evidentiary arguments against the [subject]-first approach begin to lose their
persuasiveness ... as one moves out of the emergency detention context."
210
In many jurisdictions, a commitment hearing designed to check the emergency
detention takes place two or more days after the detention. 211 In such cases,
there will be ample time for the state to gather the information necessary for an
actuarial assessment and for the defense to make a decision as to whether
clinical prediction testimony will be proffered. Furthermore, as the
"situational and temporal gap" between the precipitating behavior and the
predicted outcome (that is, violence in the community) increases, the accuracy
of the prediction will decrease and concerns about prejudice will mount. An
additional concern is that adversarial protections are notoriously lacking at
civil commitment proceedings; 212 although previous discussion suggested
cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses are seldom successful at exposing
flaws in clinical prediction testimony, their absence here nonetheless enhances
the need for a subject-first rule outside the emergency setting.
CONCLUSION
Expert prediction testimony-whether based on actuarial, structured
professional judgment, or clinical assessment-will usually be material,
probative and helpful, if certain tenets are followed. When prediction
testimony is based on group data, the materiality factor requires courts to pay
close attention to norming and criterion variable issues. To ensure that
prediction testimony is both adequately probative and optimally helpful, courts
should only qualify as experts those mental health professionals who are
familiar with the risk literature and modem risk methodologies and who utilize
in the community would have far exceeded 41% without emergency commitment"). See generally Thomas R.
Litwack & Louis B. Schlesinger, Assessing and Predicting Violence: Research, Law and Applications, in
HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 205, 224 (Irving B. Weiner & Allen K. Hess eds., 1987) (specifying
conditions in which clinical predictions of violence can provide clear and convincing evidence of
dangerousness in the commitment context).
210 Slobogin, supra note 1, at 172-73.
211 See, e.g., VA. CODE § 37.1-67.3 (2006) (requiring a judicial hearing within 48 hours of admission);
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6250-57 (Deering 2006); CAL. CT. RULES § 1498 (West 2006) (providing for physician
"certification" within 72 hours and a full judicial hearing after 14 days of detention).
212 See REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 764-66
(2d ed. 1990).
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appropriate assessment procedures; courts should also ensure that those experts
they permit to testify describe, or at least respond to, the pertinent error rates
and avoid the ultimate legal issue of whether a subject's risk factors require
legal action. Finally, even if all of these requirements are met, in sentencing
and criminal commitment proceedings courts should exclude testimony that is
clinical in nature (rather than grounded in empirically derived probability
estimates), unless it is presented by the defense to support a claim of
nondangerousness or by the state to rebut the same.
Although obviously focused on testimony about dangerousness, the
foregoing analysis also demonstrates a number of more general points about
the use of expertise by the courts. The admissibility of expert testimony is
heavily influenced by context. Put in evidentiary terms, admissibility should
not depend solely on validity estimates, but rather on a nuanced balancing of
materiality, probative value, helpfulness, and prejudicial impact. Thus,
admissibility of particular expert evidence will vary depending on the party
presenting it, the way it is framed, and the proceeding in which it is introduced,
as well as on more conspicuous factors such as the reliability of a witness's
methodology and the breadth of his or her qualifications.
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